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作者：Ngai, L. Rachel; Pissarides, Christopher A.; Wang, Jin
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：China's hukou system imposes two main barriers to population movements. Agricultural workers get land to cultivate but are unable to trade it in a frictionless market. Social transfers (education, health, etc.) are conditional on holding a local hukou. We show that the land policy leads to over-employment in agriculture and it is the more important barrier to industrialization. Effective land tenure guarantees and a competitive rental market would correct this inefficiency. The local restricti...
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作者：Gruener, Hans Peter; Siemroth, Christoph
作者单位：University of Mannheim; University of Essex
摘要：We show how decentralized individual investments can efficiently allocate capital to innovating firms via equity crowdfunding. We develop a model where consumers have privately known consumption preferences and may act as investors. Consumers identify worthwhile investments based on their own preferences and invest in firms whose product they like. In the presence of aggregate demand uncertainty, an efficient capital allocation is achieved if all groups of consumers have enough liquidity to in...
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作者：Brueck, Tilman; Di Maio, Michele; Miaari, Sami H.
作者单位：Leibniz Association; Leibniz Institut fur Gemuse- und Zierpflanzenbau (IGZ); Parthenope University Naples; Tel Aviv University; University of Oxford
摘要：We study the effect of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on various education outcomes for Palestinian high school students in the West Bank during the Second Intifada (2000-2006). Exploiting within-school variation in the number of conflict-related Palestinian fatalities during the academic year, we show that the conflict reduces the probability of passing the final exam, the total test score, and the probability of being admitted to university. The effect of conflict varies with the type and ...
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作者：Anufriev, Mikhail; Hommes, Cars; Makarewicz, Tomasz
作者单位：University of Technology Sydney; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Otto Friedrich University Bamberg
摘要：In this paper we address the question of how individuals form expectations and invent, reinforce, and update their forecasting rules in a complex world. We do so by fitting a novel, parsimonious, and empirically validated genetic algorithm learning model with explicit heterogeneity in expectations to a set of laboratory experiments. Agents use simple linear first order price forecasting rules, adapting them to the complex evolving market environment with a Genetic Algorithm optimization proced...
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作者：Anderson, Siwan; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：That unmarried individuals die at a faster rate than married individuals at all ages is well documented. Unmarried women in developing countries face particularly severe vulnerabilities, so that excess mortality faced by the unmarried is more extreme for women in these regions compared to developed countries. We provide systematic estimates of the excess female mortality faced by older unmarried women in developing regions. We place these estimates in the context of the missing women phenomeno...
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作者：Fryer, Roland G., Jr.; Harms, Philipp; Jackson, Matthew O.
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Freiburg; Stanford University; The Santa Fe Institute
摘要：We introduce a model in which agents observe signals about the state of the world, and some signals are open to interpretation. Our decision makers first interpret each signal based on their current belief and then form a posterior on the sequence of interpreted signals. This double updating leads to confirmation bias and can lead agents who observe the same information to polarize. We explore the model's predictions in an online experiment in which individuals interpret research summaries abo...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc; Garrett, Daniel F.
作者单位：University of Bonn; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or residual deterrence. We provide a theory of residual deterrence that accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking ta...
