Residual Deterrence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dilme, Francesc; Garrett, Daniel F.
• 署名单位: University of Bonn; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1093/jeea/jvy034
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1654-1686
• 关键词: switching costs; ENFORCEMENT; reputation; crime; fines

摘要

Successes of law enforcement in apprehending offenders are often publicized events. Such events have been found to result in temporary reductions in offending, or residual deterrence. We provide a theory of residual deterrence that accounts for the incentives of both enforcement officials and potential offenders. We do so by introducing to a standard inspection framework costs that must be incurred to commence enforcement. Such costs in practice include hiring specialized staff, undertaking targeted research and coordinating personnel. We illustrate how our model can be used to address a number of policy questions regarding the optimal design of enforcement authorities.