作者：ARMSTRONG, M; VICKERS, J
摘要：Should a multiproduct monopolist whose average price is capped by regulation be allowed to engage in (third-degree) price discrimination? If the cap applies to a price index with weights proportional to demands at uniform prices, then price discrimination benefits consumers as well as the firm. But if-perhaps more realistically-it is the firm's average revenue that is capped, then consumers prefer uniform pricing. In this case total output is higher when discrimination is allowed, which increa...
作者：HADFIELD, GK
摘要：The analysis of strategic behavior frequently revolves around the problem of identifying commitment technologies that credibly expand strategic opportunities. This article revisits the question of spatial preemption to investigate the potential for organizational form to serve as a commitment technology in the effort to deter entry. The analysis demonstrates first that delegation of pricing authority to independent outlet operators through a franchise contract can deter entry. Moreover, this d...
作者：BAGWELL, K; RAMEY, G
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
作者：MALUEG, DA; SCHWARTZ, M
作者单位：Georgetown University
