作者：Doraszelski, Ulrich; Satterthwaite, Mark
作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University
摘要：We provide a general model of dynamic competition in an oligopolistic industry with investment, entry, and exit. To ensure that there exists a computationally tractable Markov-perfect equilibrium, we introduce firm heterogeneity in the form of randomly drawn, privately known scrap values and setup costs into the model. Our game of incomplete information always has an equilibrium in cutoff entry/exit strategies. In contrast, the existence of an equilibrium in the Ericson and Pakes' model of ind...
作者：Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：New Economic School
摘要：Facilitating access to courts for outside shareholders is often viewed as a remedy against managerial opportunism. My model shows that, when courts are biased toward managers, reducing the barriers to shareholder suits can lower efficiency because it can lead to either excessive litigation or excessive monitoring of managers by shareholders. The latter effect implies that easy shareholder litigation may lead to a greater use of substitute mechanisms of corporate governance rather than more rel...
