-
作者：Sandford, Jeremy A.
作者单位：University of Kentucky
摘要：What happens when type is endogenous in a reputational setting? Here, customers cannot tell experts from imitative quacks, but gain information through repeated interaction. Firm incentives to invest in expertise vary nonmonotonically in how tolerant customers are of bad outcomes; more tolerant customers are both more forgiving, making expertise less necessary, and longer tenured, increasing the value of retaining them. In equilibrium, the proportion of expert firms is bounded away from one; s...
-
作者：Laux, Volker
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：This article examines the costs and benefits of permitting executives to use inside information to time their stock option exercises. Whereas prior research has focused on the negative effects of timing discretion, I show that such discretion can have beneficial incentive effects in that it leads to improved project abandonment decisions. This result follows because at-the-money options used to induce managerial effort tilt the CEO's preferences toward project continuation. When the CEO is fre...
-
作者：Bos, Iwan; Harrington, Joseph E., Jr.
作者单位：Maastricht University; Johns Hopkins University
摘要：In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity-constrained price game, we endogenize the composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When firms are sufficiently patient, there exists a stable cartel involving the largest firms. A firm with sufficiently small capacity is not a member of any stable cartel. When a cartel is not all-inclusive, colluding firms set a price that serves as an umbrella with non-cartel members pricing below it and producing at capacity. ...
-
作者：Khalil, Fahad; Lawarree, Jacques; Yun, Sungho
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Hanyang University
摘要：Both bribery and extortion weaken the power of incentives, but there is a trade-off in fighting the two because rewards to prevent supervisors from accepting bribes create incentives for extortion. Which is the worse evil? A fear of inducing extortion may make it optimal to tolerate bribery, but extortion is never allowed. Extortion discourages good behavior because the agent suffers from it even though he has done the right thing, whereas a bribe acts as a penalty for bad behavior. Our analys...
-
作者：Asker, John; Cantillon, Estelle
作者单位：New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (fixed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyer's optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a theoretical and numerical benchmark to study simpler buying procedures such as scoring auctions and bargaining. Scoring auctions can extract a significant proportion of the buyer's strategic surplus (the di...
