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作者：Gaudin, Germain
作者单位：IMT - Institut Mines-Telecom; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Telecom Paris
摘要：This article revisits the opportunism problem faced by an upstream monopolist contracting with several retailers over secret agreements, when contracts are linear. We characterize the equilibrium under secret contracts and compare it to that under public contracts in a setting allowing for general forms of demand and retail competition. Market distortions are more severe under secret contracts if and only if retailers' instruments are strategic complements. We also investigate the effect of op...
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作者：Dafny, Leemore; Ho, Kate; Lee, Robin S.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Princeton University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：We consider the effect of mergers between firms whose products are not viewed as direct substitutes for the same good or service, but are bundled by a common intermediary. Focusing on hospital mergers across distinct geographic markets, we show that such combinations can reduce competition among merging hospitals for inclusion in insurers' networks, leading to higher prices (or lower-quality care). Using data on hospital mergers from 1996-2012, we find support that this mechanism operates with...
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作者：Spier, Kathryn E.; Prescott, J. J.
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：Two risk-averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third-party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk-neu...
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作者：Vasserman, Shoshana; Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Harvard University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We develop a tractable and versatile model of pretrial negotiation in which the negotiating parties are optimistic about the judge's decision and anticipate the possible arrival of public information about the case prior to the trial date. The parties will settle immediately upon the arrival of information. However, they may also agree to settle prior to an arrival. We derive the settlement dynamics prior to an arrival: negotiations result in either immediate agreement, a weak deadline effect-...
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作者：Stepanov, Sergey
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：I model the choice between a negotiated block trade and a public tender offer as means of acquiring control in a firm with a large minority blockholder. Potential acquirers differ in their (privately known) value-creation ability. In equilibrium, block trades are made by lower ability acquirers compared to tender offers. The equal opportunity rule (EOR) and the freezeout rule are complements in promoting efficiency of control transfers. Stronger investor protection may hamper value-increasing ...
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作者：Fu, Shiming; Krishna, R. Vijay
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities. Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent has less incentive to misrepresent information. The agent's compensation is less than what he can divert and is convex in performance. As private information becomes more persistent, (i) the agent is co...
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作者：Polanski, Arnold
作者单位：University of East Anglia
摘要：Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities, and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a communication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these ...
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作者：Frandsen, Brigham; Powell, Michael; Rebitzer, James B.
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Northwestern University; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We propose a common-agency model for explaining inefficient contracting in the US healthcare system. Common-agency problems arise when multiple payers seek to motivate a provider to invest in improved care coordination. We highlight the possibility of sticking points, that is, Pareto-dominated equilibria in which payers coordinate around contracts which give weak incentives to the provider. Sticking points rationalize three hard-to-explain features of the US healthcare system: widespread fee-f...
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作者：Gu, Dingwei; Yao, Zhiyong; Zhou, Wen; Bai, Rangrang
作者单位：Fudan University; University of Hong Kong
摘要：Motivated by the recent antitrust cases in which Japanese auto parts suppliers colluded to raise supply prices against their long-term collaborators, the Japanese carmakers, we study the conditions under which an upstream collusion is profitable even after compensating downstream direct purchasers. Oligopoly competition in successive industries is shown to give rise to a vertical externality and a horizontal externality. If a collusive price of intermediate goods better balances the two extern...
