作者：Bisceglia, Michele; Piccolo, Salvatore
作者单位：Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; University of Bergamo
摘要：We study a two-period industry where firms are run by agents privately informed about their (persistent) costs, and principals can only use spot contracts. We characterize novel semi-separating equilibria where principals randomize in one or both periods. These equilibria have the following implications for industry dynamics and firms' performance. First, despite some principals learning their agents' type early on, aggregate output need not increase over time: the inefficiencies generated by ...
作者：Bonnet, Celine; Bouamra-Mechemache, Zohra; Molina, Hugo
作者单位：INRAE; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Universite Paris Saclay; INRAE; AgroParisTech
摘要：We develop a bilateral oligopoly framework with manufacturer-retailer bargaining to analyze the impact of retail mergers on market outcomes. We show that the surplus division between manufacturers and retailers depends on three bargaining forces and can be interpreted in terms of an equilibrium of fear. We estimate our framework in the French soft drink industry and find that retailers have greater bargaining power than manufacturers. Using counterfactual simulations, we highlight that retail ...
