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作者：Luo, Yao; Takahashi, Hidenori
作者单位：University of Toronto; Kyoto University
摘要：Procurement projects often involve substantial uncertainty in inputs at the time of contracting. Whether the procurer or contractor assumes such risk depends on the specific contractual agreement. We develop a model of auction contracts where bidders have multidimensional private information. Bidders balance skewed bidding and risk exposure; both efficient and inefficient bidders submit a low bid via skewed bidding. We document evidence of i) risk-balancing behavior through bid portfolio forma...
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作者：Knutsen, Magnus Vage
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：I set up a dynamic experience goods model where a long-lived seller interacts with a sequence of short-lived buyers and where the seller has reputational concerns. The key innovation of the article is to endogenize prices in this framework, specifically by endowing either the seller or the buyers with the ability to post price. I show that influence over prices has a strong impact on equilibrium characteristics. If the seller posts price, equilibria will display work-shirk dynamics. If the buy...
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作者：Domnisoru, Ciprian; Schiopu, Ioana
作者单位：Aalto University; Universitat Ramon Llull; Escuela Superior de Administracion y Direccion de Empresas (ESADE)
摘要：For-profit colleges have increased their share of the 4-year college market, particularly among nontraditional and online students, raising concerns about post-graduation outcomes. We set up and calibrate a general equilibrium model of college choice to analyze how for-profits compete with public and private nonprofit institutions. We quantify their response to changes in Pell Grant caps, public university subsidies, and gainful employment legislation linking federal funding to graduates' debt...
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作者：Harrington Jr, Joseph E.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：In markets with price discrimination, firms can face a trade-off when colluding. To maintain price discrimination, upper-level executives may have to involve lower-level employees with the requisite demand information but that enhances the risk of the cartel's discovery. They could instead centralize pricing authority, but that means less price discrimination. Here, we consider a third option, which is for executives to coordinate on inflating the cost used in pricing by lower-level employees....
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作者：Nocke, Volker; Schutz, Nicolas
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Using an aggregative games approach, we analyze horizontal mergers in a model of multiproduct-firm price competition with CES and logit demand, allowing for arbitrary firm and product heterogeneity. We provide conditions under which a merger raises consumer surplus, and establish the dynamic optimality of a myopic, consumer-surplus-based merger approval policy. We also study the aggregate surplus and external effects of a merger. Finally, we show that the market power effect of a merger, defin...
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作者：Aridor, Guy
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Substitution patterns are a crucial input to antitrust analysis, but measuring them for free digital products has proved difficult due to the lack of price variation. I measure substitution patterns by installing software on experimental participants' Android phones that restricts access to Instagram or YouTube-generating variation in choice sets-and monitoring how participants reallocate their time. I find that participants substitute to multiple product categories in both restrictions but al...
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作者：Ning, Z. Eddie
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Some projects require collaboration between firms to implement. The expected return from such a project can change over time due to evolving market conditions or the arrival of new information. Each firm may also choose an outside option rather than collaborating. In such a case, when is the joint project implemented, and how do firms split the return? To address these questions, the paper studies a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining with a stochastic cake and outside options. I sho...
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作者：Vollmer, Drew
摘要：In what circumstances is allowing resale more efficient than providing refunds? I study common aftermarket policies in perishable goods markets with demand uncertainty. Using primary and resale market data on college football ticket sales, I estimate a structural model comparing resale, which has flexible prices but incurs frictions, to a partial refund scheme, which is centralized but has rigid prices. In the model, consumers anticipate shocks when making initial purchases, then engage in res...
