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作者：Olszewski, Wojciech; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Pennsylvania; Northwestern University
摘要：A decision maker, named Alice, wants to know if an expert has significant information about payoff-relevant probabilities of future events. The expert, named Bob, either knows this probability almost perfectly or knows nothing about it. Hence, both Alice and the uninformed expert face uncertainty: they do not know the payoff-relevant probability. Alice offers a contract to Bob. If he accepts this contract then he must announce the probability distribution before any data are observed. Once the...
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作者：Eyster, Erik; Kittsteiner, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper shows how political parties differentiate to reduce electoral competition. Two parties choose platforms in a unidimensional policy space, and then candidates from these parties compete for votes in a continuum of constituencies with different median voters. Departing from their parties' platforms is costly enough that candidates do not take the median voter's preferred position in every constituency. Because the candidate whose party is located closer to the median voter gets a high...
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作者：Benoit, Jean-Pierre; Ok, Efe A.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; New York University
摘要：We address the following question: When can one person properly be said to be more delay averse than another? In reply, several (nested) comparison methods are developed. These methods yield a theory of delay aversion which parallels that of risk aversion. The applied strength of this theory is demonstrated in a variety of dynamic economic settings, including the classical optimal growth and tree cutting problems, repeated games, and bargaining. Both time-consistent and time-inconsistent scena...
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作者：Dekel, Eddie; Fudenberg, Drew; Morris, Stephen
作者单位：Northwestern University; Tel Aviv University; Harvard University; Princeton University
摘要：This paper proposes the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability, and shows that all types that have the same hierarchies of beliefs have the same set of interim-correlated-rationalizable outcomes. This solution concept characterizes common certainty of rationality in the universal type space.
