4期

最新文章

• Price dispersion and loss leaders AI翻译
  作者：Ambrus, Attila; Weinstein, Jonathan
  作者单位：Harvard University; Northwestern University
  摘要：Dispersion in retail prices of identical goods is inconsistent with the standard model of price competition among identical firms, which predicts that all prices will be driven down to cost. One common explanation for such dispersion is the use of a loss-leader strategy, in which a firm prices one good below cost in order to attract a higher customer volume for profitable goods. By assuming each consumer is forced to buy all desired goods at a single firm, we create the possibility of an effec...
• Risk taking and gender in hierarchies AI翻译
  作者：Scotchmer, Suzanne
  作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
  摘要：In a labor market hierarchy, promotions are affected by the noisiness of information about the candidates. I study the hypothesis that males are more risk taking than females, and its implications for rates of promotion and abilities of survivors. I define promotion hierarchies with and without memory, where memory means that promotion depends on the entire history of success. In both types of hierarchies, the surviving risk takers have lower average ability whenever they have a higher surviva...
• Consumer optimism and price discrimination AI翻译
  作者：Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran
  作者单位：Brown University; University of London; University College London
  摘要：We study monopolistic design of a menu of non-linear tariffs when consumers have biased prior beliefs regarding their future preferences. In our model, consumers are optimistic if their prior belief assigns too much weight to states of nature characterized by large gains from trade. A consumer's degree of optimism is his private information, and the monopolist employs the menu of non-linear tariffs to screen it. We characterize the optimal menu and show that the existence of non-common priors ...
• Contagion through learning AI翻译
  作者：Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
  作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of Toronto
  摘要：We study learning in a large class of complete information normal form games. Players continually face new strategic situations and must form beliefs by extrapolation from similar past situations. We characterize the long-run outcomes of learning in terms of iterated dominance in a related incomplete information game with subjective priors. The use of extrapolations in learning may generate contagion of actions across games even if players learn only from games with payoffs very close to the c...