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作者：Zhu, Tao
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Glasgow
摘要：This paper formulates equilibrium concepts in the large (nonatomic) household model under the team notion, characterizes a class of equilibrium allocations, explores whether an equilibrium allocation in the large-household model is a limit of equilibrium allocations in the finite-household model, and establishes existence of equilibrium allocations generated by generalized Nash bargaining.
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作者：Chen, Yi-Chun; Xiong, Siyang
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We show by an example that Proposition 2 in Topologies on types by Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris [Theoretical Economics 1 (2006), 275-309] is not true.
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作者：Epstein, Larry G.; Noor, Jawwad; Sandroni, Alvaro
作者单位：Boston University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper models an agent in a multi-period setting who does not update according to Bayes' Rule, and who is self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. Choice-theoretic axiomatic foundations are provided to capture updating biases that reflect excessive weight given to either prior beliefs, or, alternatively, to observed data. A counterpart of the exchangeable Bayesian learning model is also described.
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作者：Oyama, Daisuke; Takahashi, Satoru; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Princeton University; University of Vienna
摘要：This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a supermodular normal formgame. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone potential maximizer, then the corresponding stationary state is uniquely linearly absorbing and globally accessible for any small degree of friction. A simple example of a unanimity game with three players...
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作者：Park, Andreas; Smith, Lones
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：There are two varieties of timing games in economics: wars of attrition, in which having more predecessors helps, and pre-emption games, in which having more predecessors hurts. This paper introduces and explores a spanning class with rank-order payoffs that subsumes both varieties as special cases. We assume time is continuous, actions are unobserved, and information is complete, and explore how equilibria of the games, in which there is shifting between phases of slow and explosive (positive...
