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作者：Noor, Jawwad; Takeoka, Norio
作者单位：Boston University; Yokohama National University
摘要：This paper extends the theory of temptation and self-control introduced by Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) to allow for increasing marginal costs of resisting temptation, that is, convex self-control costs. It also proves a representation theorem that admits a general class of self-control cost functions. Both models maintain the Order, Continuity, and Set Betweenness axioms but violate Independence.
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作者：Cho, In-Koo; Meyn, Sean P.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Chicago; University of Illinois Chicago Hospital
摘要：This paper examines a dynamic general equilibrium model with supply friction. With or without friction, the competitive equilibrium is efficient. Without friction, the market price is completely determined by the marginal production cost. If friction is present, no matter how small, then the market price fluctuates between zero and the choke-up price, without any tendency to converge to the marginal production cost, exhibiting considerable volatility. The distribution of the gains from trading...
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作者：Martimort, David; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：The provision of public goods under asymmetric information has most often been viewed as a mechanism design problem under the aegis of an uninformed mediator. This paper focuses on institutional contexts without such a mediator. Contributors privately informed on their willingness to pay non-cooperatively offer contribution schedules to an agent who produces the public good on their behalf. In any separating and informative equilibrium of this common agency game under asymmetric information, i...
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作者：Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Munich
摘要：We study a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. Its intensity is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We considerMarkov perfect equilibria with beliefs as the state variable and show that all such equilibria exhibit an encouragement effect relative to the single-agent optimum. There is no equilibrium in which all players use cutoff strategies. Owing to the encouragement effect, asymm...
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作者：Virag, Gabor
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：The literature on competing auctions offers a model where sellers compete for buyers by setting reserve prices. An outstanding conjecture (e.g., Peters and Severinov 1997) is that the sellers post prices close to their marginal costs when the market becomes large. This conjecture is confirmed in this paper: we show that if all sellers have zero costs, then the equilibrium reserve price converges to 0 in distribution. Under further conditions there is a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. In t...
