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作者：Mishra, Debasis; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We consider deterministic dominant strategy implementation in multidimensional dichotomous domains in a private values and quasilinear utility setting. In such multidimensional domains, an agent's type is characterized by a single number, the value of the agent, and a nonempty set of acceptable alternatives. Each acceptable alternative gives the agent utility equal to his value and other alternatives give him zero utility. We identify a new condition, which we call generation monotonicity, tha...
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作者：Matthews, Steven A.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper concerns multistage games, with and without discounting, in which each player can increase the level of an action over time so as to increase the other players' future payoffs. An action profile is said to be achievable if it is the limit point of a subgame perfect equilibrium path. Necessary conditions are derived for achievability under relatively general conditions. They imply that any efficient profile that is approximately achievable must be in the core of the underlying coalit...
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作者：Hafalir, Isa E.; Yenmez, M. Bumin; Yildirim, Muhammed A.
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Harvard University
摘要：The prevalent affirmative action policy in school choice limits the number of admitted majority students to give minority students higher chances to attend their desired schools. There have been numerous efforts to reconcile affirmative action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms. Nevertheless, it is theoretically shown that under these algorithms, the policy based on majority quotas may be detrimental to minorities. Usi...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio
作者单位：New York University
摘要：I introduce a new framework to study environments with both structural and strategic uncertainty, different from Harsanyi's (19671968) Bayesian games, that allows a researcher to test the robustness of Nash predictions while maintaining certain desirable restrictions on players' beliefs. The solution concept applied to this environment is rationalizable conjectural equilibrium (RCE), which integrates both learning from feedback (in the spirit of self-confirming equilibrium) and from introspect...
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作者：Sadowski, Philipp
作者单位：Duke University
摘要：Following Kreps (1979), I consider a decision maker who is uncertain about her future taste. This uncertainty leaves the decision maker with a preference for flexibility: When choosing among menus that contain alternatives for future choice, she weakly prefers menus with additional alternatives. Standard representations that accommodate this choice pattern cannot distinguish tastes (indexed by a subjective state space) and beliefs (a probability measure over the subjective states) as different...
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作者：Mailath, George J.; Postlewaite, Andrew; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Yale University
摘要：Different markets are cleared by different types of prices: seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration valuesthe values to the transacting agents prior to any transferscreated by a buyerseller match. Personalized-price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premune...
