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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter; Hofbauer, Josef; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：University of Exeter; University of Vienna; University of Bielefeld
摘要：We call a correspondence, defined on the set of mixed strategy profiles, a generalized best reply correspondence if it (i) has a product structure, (ii) is upper hemicontinuous, (iii) always includes a best reply to any mixed strategy profile, and (iv) is convex-and closed-valued. For each generalized best reply correspondence, we define a generalized best reply dynamics as a differential inclusion based on it. We call a face of the set of mixed strategy profiles a minimally asymptotically sta...
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作者：Skiadas, Costis
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Preferences are defined over payoffs that are contingent on a finite number of states representing a horse race (Knightian uncertainty) and a roulette wheel (objective risk). The class of scale-invariant (SI) ambiguity-averse preferences, in a broad sense, is uniquely characterized by a multiple-prior utility representation. Adding a weak certainty-independence axiom is shown to imply either unit co-efficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) toward roulette risk or SI maxmin expected utility. ...
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作者：Karantounias, Anastasios G.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
摘要：This paper studies the design of optimal fiscal policy when a government that fully trusts the probability model of government expenditures faces a fearful public that forms pessimistic expectations. We identify two forces that shape our results. On the one hand, the government has an incentive to concentrate tax distortions on events that it considers unlikely relative to the pessimistic public. On the other hand, the endogeneity of the public's expectations gives rise to a novel motive for e...
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作者：Mueller-Frank, Manuel
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper provides a formal characterization of the process of rational learning in social networks. Agents receive initial private information and select an action out of a choice set under uncertainty in each of infinitely many periods, observing the history of choices of their neighbors. Choices are made based on a common behavioral rule. Conditions under which rational learning leads to global consensus, local indifference, and local disagreement are characterized. In the general setting ...
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作者：Vida, Peter; Forges, Francoise
作者单位：University of Mannheim; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended game, in which before choosing actions as in the Bayesian game, the players engage in a possibly infinitely long (but in equilibrium almost surely finite), direct, cheap talk.
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作者：Ambrus, Attila; Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Kamada, Yuichiro
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We investigate situations in which agents can communicate to each other only through a chain of intermediators, for example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication are strategic and might want to influence the action taken by the final receiver. The set of pure strategy equilibrium outcomes is simple to characterize, is monotonic in each intermediator's bias, and does not depend on the order of intermediators; inter...
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作者：Chen, Jing; Micali, Silvio
作者单位：Institute for Advanced Study - USA; State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Shimoji and Watson (1998) prove that a strategy of an extensive game is rationalizable in the sense of Pearce if and only if it survives the maximal elimination of conditionally dominated strategies. Briefly, this process iteratively eliminates conditionally dominated strategies according to a specific order, which is also the start of an order of elimination of weakly dominated strategies. Since the final set of possible payoff profiles, or terminal nodes, surviving iterated elimination of we...
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作者：Braido, Luis H. B.
摘要：This paper studies recursive exchange economies with short sales. Agents maximize discounted expected utility. The asset structure is general and includes real securities, infinite-lived stocks, options, and other derivatives. The main result shows the existence of a competitive equilibrium process that is stationary and has an invariant ergodic measure. Ergodicity is required in finance for time series analysis of structural asset pricing models. This equilibrium property is difficult to obta...
