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作者：Ekmekci, Mehmet; Yenmez, M. Bumin
摘要：Increasingly, more school districts across the United States are using centralized admissions for charter, magnet, and neighborhood schools in a common enrollment system. We first show that across all school-participation patterns, full participation in the common (or unified) enrollment system leads to the most preferred outcome for students. Second, we show that, in general, participation by all schools may not be achievable because schools have incentives to stay out. This may explain why s...
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作者：Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, Alexandru; Ostrovsky, Michael; Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Harvard University; Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Melbourne; Stanford University; University of Cologne
摘要：Various forms of substitutability are essential for establishing the existence of equilibria and other useful properties in diverse settings such as matching, auctions, and exchange economies with indivisible goods. We extend earlier models' definitions of substitutability to settings in which each agent can be both a buyer in some transactions and a seller in others, and show that all these definitions are equivalent. We then introduce a new class of substitutable preferences that allows us t...
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作者：Richter, Michael; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：We suggest a concept of convexity of preferences that does not rely on any algebraic structure. A decision maker has in mind a set of orderings interpreted as evaluation criteria. A preference relation is defined to be convex when it satisfies the following condition: If, for each criterion, there is an element that is both inferior to b by the criterion and superior to a by the preference relation, then b is preferred to a. This definition generalizes the standard Euclidean definition of conv...
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作者：Battaglini, Marco; Lamba, Rohit
作者单位：Cornell University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We explore the conditions under which the first-order approach (FO approach) can be used to characterize profit maximizing contracts in dynamic principal-agent models. The FO approach works when the resulting FO-optimal contract satisfies a particularly strong form of monotonicity in types, a condition that is satisfied in most of the solved examples studied in the literature. The main result of our paper is to show that except for nongeneric choices of the stochastic process governing the typ...
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作者：Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix
作者单位：Stanford University; Technical University of Munich
摘要：Developing normative foundations for optimal play in two-player zero-sum games has turned out to be surprisingly difficult, despite the powerful strategic implications of the minimax theorem. We characterize maximin strategies by postulating coherent behavior in varying games. The first axiom, called consequentialism, states that how probability is distributed among completely indistinguishable actions is irrelevant. The second axiom, consistency, demands that strategies that are optimal in tw...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten; Kasberger, Bernhard
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); University of Oxford
摘要：The combinatorial clock auction (CCA) has frequently been used in recent spectrum auctions. It combines a dynamic clock phase and a one-off supplementary round. The winning allocation and the corresponding prices are determined by the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves rules. These rules should encourage truthful bidding, whereas the clock phase is intended to reveal information. We inquire into the role of the clock when bidders have lexicographic preferences for raising rivals' costs. We show that in an ...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Gitmez, A. Arda; Yilmaz, Ozgur
作者单位：North Carolina State University; University of Chicago; Koc University
摘要：We generalize the school choice problem by defining a notion of allowable priority violations. In this setting, a weak axiom of stability (partial stability) allows only certain priority violations. We introduce a class of algorithms called the student exchange under partial fairness (SEPF). Each member of this class gives a partially stable matching that is not Pareto dominated by another partially stable matching (i.e., constrained efficient in the class of partially stable matchings). Moreo...
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作者：Austen-Smith, David; Dziuda, Wioletta; Harstad, Bard; Loeper, Antoine
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Chicago; University of Oslo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier to repeal than efficient instruments. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficien...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We study population game dynamics under which each revising agent tests each of his strategies a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent, and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest. In the centipede game, these best experienced payoff dynamics lead to cooperative play. When strategies are tested once, play at the almost globally stable state is concentrated on the last few nodes of the game, with the proportions of agents playing...
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作者：Deb, Joyee; Gonzalez-Diaz, Julio
作者单位：Yale University; Universidade de Santiago de Compostela
摘要：We study impersonal exchange and ask how agents can behave honestly in anonymous transactions without contracts. We analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about cooperation in this setting beyond the prisoner's dilemma. We show that cooperation can be sustained quite generally, using community enforcement and trust-building. The latter refers to an initial phase in which one community builds trust by not deviating des...
