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作者：Dur, Umut; Morrill, Thayer; Phan, William
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last condition disqualifies the standard approach of considering grades independently as it may separate siblings. We argue that the central criterion in school choice-elimination of justified envy-is now ina...
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作者：Fulton, Chad
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：This paper studies static rational inattention problems with multiple actions and multiple shocks. We solve for the optimal signals chosen by agents and provide tools to interpret information processing. By relaxing restrictive assumptions previously used to gain tractability, we allow agents more latitude to choose what to pay attention to. Our applications examine the pricing problem of a monopolist who sells in multiple markets and the portfolio problem of an investor who can invest in mult...
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作者：Zhao, Chen
作者单位：University of Hong Kong
摘要：I propose an axiomatic framework for belief revision when new information is qualitative, of the form event A is at least as likely as event B. My decision maker need not have beliefs about the joint distribution of the signal she will receive and the payoff-relevant states. I propose three axioms, Exchangeability, Stationarity, and Reduction, to characterize the class of pseudo-Bayesian updating rules. The key axiom, Exchangeability, requires that the order in which the information arrives do...
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作者：Schumacher, Heiner; Thysen, Heidi Christina
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：We study a principal-agent framework in which the agent forms beliefs about the principal's project based on a misspecified subjective model. She fits this model to the objective probability distribution to predict output under alternative actions. Misspecifications in the subjective model may lead to biased beliefs. However, under mild restrictions, the agent has correct beliefs on the equilibrium path so that the optimal contract is nonexploitative. This allows for a behavioral version of th...
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作者：Ellis, Andrew; Piccione, Michele; Zhang, Shengxing
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We study the effects of diverse beliefs on equilibrium securitization under risk neutrality. We provide a simple characterization of the optimal securities. Pooling and tranching of assets emerges in equilibrium as a consequence of the traders' diverse beliefs about asset returns. The issuer of securities tranches the asset pool, and traders sort among the tranches according to their beliefs. We show how the traders' disagreement about the correlation of asset returns is a key factor in determ...
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作者：Branch, William A.; McGough, Bruce; Zhu, Mei
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine; University of Oregon
摘要：This paper shows that belief-driven economic fluctuations are a general feature of many determinate macroeconomic models. In environments with hidden state variables, forecast-model misspecification can break the link between indeterminacy and sunspots by establishing the existence of statistical sunspots in models that have a unique rational expectations equilibrium. To form expectations, agents regress on a set of observables that can include serially correlated nonfundamental factors (e.g.,...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：Shortages in organs for transplantation have resulted in a renewed interest in designing incentive policies to promote organ supply. The donor-priority rule, which grants priority for transplantation based on deceased organ donor registration status, has proven to be effective in both theory and practice. This study investigates the implications of the donor-priority rule for optimal deceased organ allocation policy design under a general formulation of blood-type barriers. We find that for an...
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作者：Antinolfi, Gaetano; Carapella, Francesca; Carli, Francesco
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors; Deakin University
摘要：This paper studies the optimal clearing arrangement for bilateral financial contracts in which an assessment of counterparty credit risk is crucial for efficiency. The economy is populated by borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are subject to limited commitment and hold private information about the severity of such lack of commitment. Lenders can acquire information, at a cost, about the commitment of their borrowers, which affects the assessment of counterparty risk. Clearing through a central ...
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作者：Mekonnen, Teddy; Leal Vizcaino, Rene
作者单位：Brown University; Bank of Mexico
摘要：We study how changes to the informativeness of signals in Bayesian games and single-agent decision problems affect the distribution of equilibrium actions. Focusing on supermodular environments, we provide conditions under which a more precise private signal for one agent leads to an increasing-mean spread or a decreasing-mean spread of equilibrium actions for all agents. We apply our comparative statics to information disclosure games between a sender and many receivers and derive sufficient ...
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作者：Nikzad, Afshin
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We prove that in a market where agents rank objects independently and uniformly at random, there exists an assignment of objects to agents with a constant average rank (i.e., an average rank independent of the market size). The proof builds on techniques from random graph theory and the FKG inequality (Fortuin et al. (1971)). When the agents' rankings are their private information, no Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible mechanism can implement the assignment with the smallest average rank; ...
