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作者：Moroni, Sofia
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We consider a moral hazard problem in which a principal provides incentives to a team of agents to work on a risky project. The project consists of two milestones of unknown feasibility. While working unsuccessfully, the agents' private beliefs regarding the feasibility of the project decline. This learning requires the principal to provide rents to prevent the agents from procrastinating and free-riding on others' discoveries. To reduce these rents, the principal stops the project inefficient...
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作者：Martimort, David; Stole, Lars A.
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; University of Chicago
摘要：We present a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for a class of optimal control problems with pure state constraints for which the objective function is linear in the state variable but the objective function is only required to be upper semicontinuous in the control variable. We apply those conditions to economic environments in contract theory where discontinuities in objectives prevail. Examples of applications include nonlinear pricing of digital goods and nonlinear pricing under co...
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Park, In-Uck
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Bristol
摘要：We show that information exchange via disclosure is possible in equilibrium even when it is certain that whenever one party learns the truth, the other loses. The incentive to disclose results either from an expectation of disclosure being reciprocated-the quid pro quo motive-or from the possibility of learning from the rival's failure to act in response to a disclosure-the screening motive. Alternating and gradual disclosures are generally indispensable for information exchange and the number...
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作者：Bird, Daniel; Frug, Alexander
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long-term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual components (e.g., wage, effort, level of production, etc.). We then provide a tight condition under which such activities manifest a form of seniority in every contracting problem in which they are present: any change that occurs in the level of the ...
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作者：Condorelli, Daniele; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We characterize equilibria of oligopolistic markets where identical firms with constant marginal cost compete a la Cournot. For given maximal willingness to pay and maximal total demand, we first identify all combinations of equilibrium consumer surplus and industry profit that can arise from arbitrary demand functions. Then, as a further restriction, we fix the average willingness to pay above marginal cost (i.e., first-best surplus) and identify all possible triples of consumer surplus, indu...
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作者：Gensbittel, Fabien; Peski, Marcin; Renault, Jerome
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; University of Toronto
摘要：We define the distance between two information structures as the largest possible difference in value across all zero-sum games. We provide a tractable characterization of distance and use it to discuss the relation between the value of information in games versus single-agent problems, the value of additional information, informational substitutes, complements, or joint information. The convergence to a countable information structure under value-based distance is equivalent to the weak conve...
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作者：Kosterina, Svetlana
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using the receiver's prior that is the worst for the sender. I characterize the optimal information structures in this environment. I show that there exists an optimal signal with two realizations, characterize the support of the signal realization recommending approval,, and show that the optimal signal is a hyperbola. ...
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作者：Weksler, Ran; Zik, Boaz
作者单位：University of Haifa; University of Bonn
摘要：We study a receiver's learning problem of choosing an informative test in a signaling environment. Each test induces a signaling subgame. Thus, in addition to its direct effect on the receiver's information, a test has an indirect effect through the sender's signaling strategy. We show that the informativeness of signaling in the equilibrium that a test induces depends on the relative informativeness of the test's high and low grades. Consequently, we find that the receiver's preference relati...
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作者：Chassang, Sylvain; Kapon, Samuel
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：A principal seeks to efficiently allocate a productive public resource to a number of possible users. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms provide a detail-free way to do so provided users have deep pockets. In practice however, users may have limited resources. We study a dynamic allocation problem in which participants have limited liability: transfers are made ex post, and only if the productive efforts of participants are successful. We show that it is possible to approximate the perform...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Strack, Philipp
作者单位：Yale University
摘要：A single seller faces a sequence of buyers with unit demand. The buyers are forward-looking and long-lived. Each buyer has private information about his arrival time and valuation where the latter evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion. Any incentive-compatible mechanism has to induce truth-telling about the arrival time and the evolution of the valuation. We establish that the optimal stationary allocation policy can be implemented by a simple posted price. The truth-telling constra...
