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作者：Gottlieb, Daniel; Moreira, Humberto
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：We study a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. Risk-neutral agents with limited liability have arbitrary private information about the distribution of outputs and the cost of effort. We show that under a multiplicative separability condition, the optimal mechanism offers a single contract. This condition holds, for example, when output is binary. If the principal's payoff must also satisfy free disposal and the distribution of outputs has the monotone likelihood rati...
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作者：He, Kevin
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania
摘要：I study endogenous learning dynamics for people who misperceive intertemporal correlations in random sequences. Biased agents face an optimal-stopping problem. They are uncertain about the underlying distribution and learn its parameters from predecessors. Agents stop when early draws are good enough, so predecessors' experiences contain negative streaks but not positive streaks. When agents wrongly expect systematic reversals (the gambler's fallacy), they understate the likelihood of consecut...
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作者：Hugonnier, Julien; Lester, Benjamin; Weill, Pierre-Olivier
作者单位：Swiss Finance Institute (SFI); Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study a canonical model of decentralized exchange for a durable good or asset, where agents are assumed to have time-varying, heterogeneous utility types. Whereas the existing literature has focused on the special case of two types, we allow agents' utility to be drawn from an arbitrary distribution. Our main contribution is methodological: we provide a solution technique that delivers a complete characterization of the equilibrium, in closed form, both in and out of the steady state. This ...
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作者：Rubinstein, Ariel; Yildiz, Kemal
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; New York University; Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University
摘要：The jungle model with an equal number of agents and objects is enriched by adding a language, which is a set of orderings over the set of agents. An assignment of an agent to an object is justified within a group of agents if there is an ordering according to which that agent is the best suited in the group. A civilized equilibrium is an assignment such that every agent is the strongest in the group of agents consisting of himself and those who wish to be assigned to the object and can be just...
