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作者：Kolotilin, Anton; Wolitzky, Alexander
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We offer a simple analysis of the problem of choosing a statistical experiment to optimize the induced distribution of posterior medians or, more generally, q-quantiles for any q is an element of (0,1). We show that a single experiment-the q-quantile matching experiment-implements all implementable distributions of posterior q-quantiles, with different distributions spanned by different selections from the sets of posterior q-quantiles. A dense subset of implementable distributions of posterio...
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作者：Tatur, Tymon
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm that everybody will want to follow. Depending on technological assumptions, the approach yields the Nash bargaining solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, the equal monetary split, and other bargaining solutions. Se...
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作者：Kocourek, Pavel; Steiner, Jakub; Stewart, Colin
作者单位：University of Duisburg Essen; University of Zurich; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; University of Toronto
摘要：Evidence suggests that consumers do not perfectly optimize, contrary to a critical assumption of classical consumer theory. We propose a model in which consumer types can vary in both their preferences and their choice behavior. Given data on demand and the distribution of prices, we identify the set of possible values of the consumer surplus based on minimal rationality conditions: every type of consumer must be no worse off than if they either always bought the good or never did. We develop ...
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作者：Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix
作者单位：University of Bonn; Technical University of Munich
摘要：We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability, (ii) if a strategy profile is played in two games, it is also played in every convex combination of these games, and (iii) players can shift probability arbitrarily between two indistinguishable actions, and deleting one of these actions has no effect. Our th...
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作者：Frick, Mira; Ishii, Yuhta
作者单位：Princeton University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We build a model studying the effect of an economy's potential for social learning on the adoption of innovations of uncertain quality. Assuming consumers are forward-looking (i.e., recognize the value of waiting for information), we analyze how qualitative and quantitative features of the learning environment affect equilibrium adoption dynamics, welfare, and the speed of learning. Based on this, we show how differences in the learning environment translate into observable differences in adop...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Mierendorff, Konrad
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech; Paris School of Economics; University of London; University College London
摘要：We study the existence of efficient auctions in private value settings in which some bidders form their expectations about the distribution of their competitor's bids based on the accessible data from past similar auctions consisting of bids and ex post values. We consider steady states in such environments with a mix of rational and data-driven bidders, and we allow for correlation across bidders in the signal distributions about the ex post values. After reviewing the working of the approach...
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作者：Passadore, Juan; Xandri, Juan Pablo
作者单位：International Monetary Fund; Universidad de los Andes - Chile
摘要：Dynamic policy games feature a wide range of equilibria. This paper provides a methodology for obtaining robust predictions. We focus on a model of sovereign debt, although our methodology applies to other settings, such as models of monetary policy or capital taxation. Our main result is a characterization of distributions over outcomes that are consistent with a subgame perfect equilibrium conditional on the observed history. We illustrate our main result by computing-conditional on an obser...
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作者：Dworczak, Piotr; Kolotilin, Anton
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：We present a unified duality approach to Bayesian persuasion. The optimal dual variable, interpreted as a price function on the state space, is shown to be a supergradient of the concave closure of the objective function at the prior belief. Strong duality holds when the objective function is Lipschitz continuous.When the objective depends on the posterior belief through a set of moments, the price function induces prices for posterior moments that solve the corresponding dual problem. Thus, o...
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作者：Nebel, Jacob M.
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. ...
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作者：Balbuzanov, Ivan; Kotowski, Maciej H.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; University of Notre Dame
摘要：This paper investigates the formation of production and trading networks in economies with general interdependencies and complex property rights. We argue that the right to exclude, a core tenet of property, grants asset owners local monopoly power that is amplified by an economy's endogenous production network. Our analysis generalizes the exclusion core, a cooperative solution concept based on the right to exclude, to markets with production. We identify sufficient (and essentially necessary...
