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作者：Bedard, Nicholas C.; Goeree, Jacob K.
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We establish the subgradient theorem for monotone correspondences: a monotone correspondence is equal to the subdifferential of a potential if and only if it is conservative, i.e., its integral along a closed path vanishes irrespective of the selection from the correspondence along the path. We prove two attendant results: the potential theorem, whereby a conservative monotone correspondence can be integrated up to a potential, and the duality theorem, whereby the potential has a dual whose su...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Echenique, Federico
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Welfare economics relies on access to agents' utility functions: we revisit classical questions in welfare economics, assuming access to data on agents' past choices instead of their utilities. Our main result considers the existence of utilities that render a given allocation Pareto optimal. We show that a candidate allocation is efficient for some utilities consistent with the choice data if and only if it is efficient for an incomplete relation derived from the revealed preference relations...
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作者：Galichon, Alfred; Samuelson, Larry; Vernet, Lucas
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Yale University; European Central Bank; Bank of France
摘要：We introduce a notion of substitutability for correspondences and establish a monotone comparative static result. More precisely, we introduce the notions of unified gross substitutes and nonreversingness and show that if Q:P paired right arrows Q is a supply correspondence defined on a set of prices P, which is a sublattice of RN, and Q satisfies these two properties, then the set of equilibrium prices Q-1(q) associated with a vector of quantities q is an element of Q is a sublattice of P and...
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作者：Kim, Jaehong; Li, Mengling; Xu, Menghan
作者单位：Xiamen University; Xiamen University
摘要：This paper examines the welfare implications of priority service in a frictional search environment with heterogeneous outside options. Priority search facilitates expedited matching with public options in the market by charging a service premium. Our main analysis demonstrates that a profit-maximizing priority search program always induces the efficient level of market participation. The key insight underpinning our results is the non-monotonic relationship between the priority service premiu...
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作者：Principi, Giulio; Wakker, Peter P.; Wang, Ruodu
作者单位：New York University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; University of Waterloo
摘要：Comonotonicity (same variation) of random variables minimizes hedging possibilities and has been widely used, e.g., in Gilboa and Schmeidler's ambiguity models. This paper investigates anticomonotonicity (opposite variation (AC)), the natural counterpart to comonotonicity. It minimizes leveraging rather than hedging possibilities. Surprisingly, AC restrictions of several traditional axioms do not give new models. Instead, they strengthen the foundations of existing classical models: (a) linear...
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作者：Agrawal, David R.; Bagh, Adib; Mardan, Mohammed
作者单位：University of Kentucky; Norwegian School of Economics (NHH)
摘要：The conventional wisdom is that a large jurisdiction sets a higher tax rate than a small jurisdiction. We show that this result arises due to simplifying assumptions that imply that tax-base sensitivities are equal across jurisdictions. When more than two jurisdictions compete in commodity taxes, tax-base sensitivities need not be equal across jurisdictions and a small jurisdiction can set a higher tax rate than a large jurisdiction. Our analysis extends to capital and profit taxes, and, more ...
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作者：Chan, Lester T.
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies a large class of multi-agent contracting models with the property that agents' payoffs constitute a weighted potential game. Multiple equilibria arise due to agents' strategic interactions. I fully characterize a contracting scheme that is optimal for the principal for all equilibrium selection criteria that are more pessimistic than potential maximization. This scheme ranks agents in ascending order of their weights in the weighted potential game and then induces them to ac...
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作者：Westkamp, Alexander
作者单位：University of Cologne
摘要：I study t & acirc;tonnement processes in a matching market without transfers. In each period, schools set cutoffs, i.e., the preference ranks of the least preferred students they are willing to admit, and students accept their most preferred offers. Cutoffs are adjusted on the basis of demand-supply imbalances. A school's adjustment from one period to the next is moderate if it is bounded by the most recently observed imbalance at that school. I show that for any period in which all schools ad...
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作者：Wong, Yu Fu
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies how a forward-looking decision maker experiments on unknown alternatives of correlated utilities. The utilities are modeled by a Brownian motion such that similar alternatives yield similar utilities. Experimentation trades off between the continuation value of exploration and the opportunity cost of exploitation. The optimal strategy is to continuously explore unknown alternatives and then exploit the best known alternative when the one being explored is found to be suffici...
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作者：[Anonymous]
摘要：We study how the separation of time and risk preferences relates to a property called stochastic impatience. We show that, within a broad class of models, stochastic impatience holds if and only if risk aversion and the inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution are sufficiently close. In the models of Epstein and Zin (1989) and Hansen and Sargent (1995), stochastic impatience is violated for all commonly used parameters. Our result also provides a simple, one-question test for the separ...
