-
作者：Goncharov, Igor; Peter, Caspar David
作者单位：Lancaster University; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Firms coordinate their actions with industry peers, thereby affecting product market competition. Using the cartel setting, we investigate how financial reporting transparency affects industry coordination. Economic theory predicts that transparency might either prolong cartel duration through increased contracting efficiency, or destabilize cartels due to earlier detection of deviating members. We test these predictions on firms indicted by the European Commission for anticompetitive behavior...
-
作者：Nichol, Jennifer E.
作者单位：Northeastern University
摘要：This study examines the effects of incentive contract framing on misreporting and entitlement. I conduct a 2 3 2 between-subjects experiment, manipulating incentive contract framing (Bonus/Penalty) and the awareness of the opportunity to misreport (Before Effort/After Effort). I predict and find that (1) penalty contracts cause a higher rate and degree of misreporting, and (2) this greater misreporting occurs due to a greater sense of entitlement to the incentive funds. Collectively, this stud...
-
作者：Dyreng, Scott D.; Hanlon, Michelle; Maydew, Edward L.
作者单位：Duke University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We investigate the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty, where tax uncertainty is the amount of unrecognized tax benefits recorded over the same time period as the tax avoidance. On average, we find that tax avoiders, i.e., firms with relatively low cash effective tax rates, bear significantly greater tax uncertainty than firms that have higher cash effective tax rates. We find that the relation between tax avoidance and tax uncertainty is stronger for firms with frequent patent ...
-
作者：Lu, Tong; Sapra, Haresh; Subramanian, Ajay
作者单位：University of Houston System; University of Houston; University of Chicago; University System of Georgia; Georgia State University
摘要：We show how shareholder-debtholder agency conflicts interact with strategic reporting under asymmetric information to influence bank regulation. Relative to a benchmark unregulated economy, higher capital requirements mitigate inefficient asset substitution, but potentially exacerbate underinvestment due to debt overhang. The optimal regulatory policy balances distortions created by agency conflicts and asymmetric information while incorporating the social benefit of bank debt. Asymmetric info...
-
作者：Heitzman, Shane M.; Ogneva, Maria
作者单位：University of Southern California
摘要：We find evidence that equity returns increase with the propensity for tax planning in a firm's industry. This risk premium is imposed on all firms in the industry, even those that are less aggressive than their peers. The industry-based risk premium coexists with a firm-specific discount associated with active tax planning strategies that carry low systematic risk. The discount on tax planning at the firm level, however, is dwarfed by the premium on tax planning at the industry level, and is c...
-
作者：Brown, Timothy; Fanning, Kirsten
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：Internal auditors frequently provide advice to managers as important input for accounting decisions. Recent practitioner guides have touted the merits of a participative or coach'' approach relative to a traditional police officer'' approach to the internal audit role. We conduct two experiments that test how managers respond to advice from an internal auditor using these different approaches. Results across both experiments suggest that when an internal auditor provides a professional favor (...
-
作者：Simunic, Dan A.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; University of British Columbia
-
作者：Glendening, Matthew; Mauldin, Elaine G.; Shaw, Kenneth W.
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recommends that firms provide MD&A disclosures quantifying the earnings effect of reasonably likely changes in critical accounting estimates (quantitative CAE). This paper examines the determinants and consequences of quantitative CAE. We find that quantitative CAE are negatively associated with management's incentives to misreport (proxied by portfolio vega) and positively associated with audit committee accounting expertise and with audit offices ...
-
作者：Balakrishnan, Karthik; Blouin, Jennifer L.; Guay, Wayne R.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We investigate whether aggressive tax planning firms have a less transparent information environment. Although tax planning provides expected tax savings, it can simultaneously increase the financial complexity of the organization. And to the extent that this greater financial complexity cannot be adequately clarified through communications with outside parties, such as investors and analysts, transparency problems can arise. Our investigation of the association between tax aggressiveness and ...
-
作者：Caskey, Judson; Ozel, N. Bugra
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：This study sheds light on the extent to which the use of operating leases depends on reporting incentives, such as understating liabilities, and non-reporting incentives that partly arise from the overlap between accounting, bankruptcy, and tax laws, such as increasing financing capacity and flexibility. We provide evidence that expanding financing capacity, accommodating volatile operations, and maximizing the present value of tax deductions are all important drivers of leasing decisions. Our...
