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作者：Lee, Kyungha (Kari); Menon, Rahul
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：This paper develops an economic model of how subjectivity in accounting estimates affects a manager's reporting behavior and auditors' subsequent information aggregation decision. In our model, the auditor receives a potentially manipulated report from the manager and uses an additional, albeit less precise, estimate to verify the report. We show, perhaps surprisingly, that as subjectivity increases, the auditor puts more weight on the manager's report, but the manager manipulates her report l...
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作者：Gaver, Jennifer J.; Utke, Steven
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of Connecticut
摘要：We argue that the association between auditor industry specialization and audit quality depends on how long the auditor has been a specialist. We measure audit quality using absolute discretionary accruals, income-increasing discretionary accruals, and book-tax differences. Our results, based on a sample of Big 4 audit clients from 2003-2015, indicate that auditors who have only recently gained the specialist designation produce a level of audit quality that does not surpass that produced by n...
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作者：Kajueter, Peter; Klassmann, Florian; Nienhaus, Martin
作者单位：University of Munster
摘要：We exploit a regulatory change in Singapore to analyze the capital market effects of mandatory quarterly reporting. The listing rule implemented in 2003 has required firms with a market capitalization above S$ 75 million-but not firms with a market capitalization below this threshold-to publish quarterly financial statements. Using regression discontinuity analysis for our identification, we provide novel evidence of the causal effects of mandatory quarterly reporting on small firms. We find a...
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作者：Baldenius, Tim; Meng, Xiaojing; Qiu, Lin
作者单位：Columbia University; New York University
摘要：We study a corporate board tasked with monitoring a firm's CEO and providing incrementally decision-relevant information. The board has both compensation and non-pecuniary incentives-we label the latter board bias. Friendly boards have muted information gathering incentives, but can more effectively engage in cheap talk communication with management. As a result, the direction of the optimal board bias is determined by the CEO's initial information advantage: the board should be weakly friendl...
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作者：Cohen, Moshe; Katz, Sharon P.; Mutlu, Sunay; Sadka, Gil
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; University System of Georgia; Kennesaw State University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：Prior evidence shows a reduction in leverage after covenant violations, but we do not know whether covenants affect leverage before they are violated. In this study, we use an exogenous accounting-based shock to debt covenants that relaxed covenant tightness (SFAS 160) and examine whether covenants constrain leverage for borrowers that are close to violation, even when the borrower is financially healthy. We find that SFAS 160 increased debt levels in firms that were close to violation. This i...
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作者：Bozanic, Zahn; Choudhary, Preeti; Merkley, Kenneth J.
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University; University of Arizona; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We examine whether securities lawyers involved in SEC comment letter inquiries act as client advocates by resisting disclosure changes or as gatekeepers by encouraging disclosure transparency. Consistent with an advocacy role, we find that securities lawyers' involvement in SEC comment letters is associated with resisting disclosure inquiries through redacting information from filings and issuing fewer amendments to previous disclosures. Our evidence also supports the view that the role of sec...
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作者：Guenther, David A.; Wilson, Ryan J.; Wu, Kaishu
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of Waterloo
摘要：We investigate whether tax avoidance becomes more uncertain as the rate of tax avoidance increases. We estimate a system of equations to demonstrate that as firms' pretax income increases, each additional dollar of potential tax results, on average, in 32.8 cents of tax avoided, which we refer to as incremental tax avoidance. Of the incremental tax avoided, 1.4 cents represent additions to the reserve for uncertain tax benefits (UTB reserve), or 4.3 percent of the total incremental tax avoided...
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作者：Kang, Jun-Koo; Xu, Limin
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Adelaide
摘要：We examine how the adoption of executive stock ownership guidelines affects debtholder wealth. We find that guideline adoption is associated with lower loan spreads, fewer collateral requirements, and fewer other restrictive covenants. The results are robust to using an instrumental variables approach. We further find that guideline adoption has a negative effect on bond yield spreads and that after the adoption, firms' risk-taking incentives are lower. These results suggest that guideline ado...
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作者：Jennings, Jared
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Prior research questions the general informational role of analysts by documenting inefficiencies, biases, and limitations of their research. Rather than examine the general informational value of analyst research, I examine the value of analyst research in a specific setting-shareholder lawsuits-when investors demand information but other information providers are limited in their ability to provide it. After the lawsuit's filing, the demand for and production of management-provided informati...
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作者：Armstrong, Christopher S.; Glaeser, Stephen; Huang, Sterling; Taylor, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Singapore Management University
摘要：We examine the relation between managers' personal income tax rates and their corporate investment decisions. Using plausibly exogenous variation in federal and state tax rates, we find a positive relation between managers' personal tax rates and their corporate risk-taking. Moreover-and consistent with our theoretical predictions-we find that this relation is stronger among firms with investment opportunities that have a relatively high rate of return per unit of risk, and stronger among CEOs...
