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作者：Gox, Robert F.; Michaeli, Beatrice
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We study how the precision of managers' private post-contract pre-decision information affects the pay-performance relation. Endogenizing the information environment, we find that firms may optimally tie executive pay closer to firm performance as agency problems become more pronounced. Specifically, varying parameters measuring the severity of the agency problem, we identify parameter regions where firms with more pronounced agency problems optimally combine uninformative signals with a highe...
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作者：Baer, Leah M.; Ertimur, Yonca; Zhang, Jingjing
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia; University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; McGill University
摘要：We examine outside board appointments of executives allegedly involved in governance failurestainted executives-to shed light on appointing firms' underlying motivations. Less attractive firms and those with greater advising needs are more likely to appoint tainted executives to their boards than other firms are. Tainted appointees are less likely to be placed on the nominating and governance committees than nontainted appointees. Tainted appointees have similar or better skill sets compared w...
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作者：Glaeser, Stephen A.; Olbert, Marcel; Werner, Ann-Catherin
作者单位：University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina School of Medicine; University of London; London Business School; University of Mannheim
摘要：We examine how exposure to international tax competition affects domestic firms' employment. Consistent with prior work, we find evidence that reductions in foreign tax rates affect the domestic competitive environment via increases in import competition and investment in foreign-owned subsidiaries. We posit that these changes in the domestic competitive environment can cause managers to reduce their firms' employment levels. Consistent with our expectation, we find that relative decreases in ...
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作者：Laux, Volker; Zheng, Ronghuo
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We study the optimal information system in a debt contracting setting in which managers can engage in value destroying risk-shifting behavior. The information system issues early-warning signals that allow lenders to take corrective actions such as liquidating unprofitable projects. When managers are empire builders, the optimal system exhibits a conservative bias that leads to excessive early-warning signals and excessive project liquidations relative to first best. In contrast, when managers...
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作者：Yezegel, Ari
作者单位：Bentley University
摘要：The ability to elicit information is a critical skill that many analysts and other information agents strive to master. This paper develops and validates a novel approach to measure analysts' skill in eliciting information and studies its relation with analysts' performance. The results suggest that analysts who are skilled in eliciting information issue more accurate forecasts and more informative stock recommendations. Further, skilled analysts' recommendations are incrementally more informa...
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作者：Baloria, Vishal P.
作者单位：University of Connecticut
摘要：Firms supply accounting conservatism in response to debt/equity contracting, litigation, political costs, and taxation demand from stakeholders. I examine whether political connections between U.S. firms and politicians moderate and/or intensify the impact of these demands on the supply of conditional and unconditional conservatism. I measure political connections based on the association between firms' campaign contributions and equity ownership in firms by U.S. House and Senate representativ...
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作者：Griffin, Paul A.; Hong, Hyun A.; Ryou, Ji Woo
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Riverside; West Virginia University
摘要：We examine whether proprietary costs drive R&D-active firms' choice of private loan structure. We find that R&D-active firms are more likely to choose single-lender over multi-lender private loan financing. This is consistent with the theory that high-ability entrepreneurs protect their proprietary knowledge by communicating it to a single lender while disclosing generic and less sensitive information to the public. This propensity, however, significantly decreases after the enactment of the A...
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作者：Ashraf, Musaib
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business
摘要：Economic theory suggests that negative peer events can result in market-wide spillovers that help unaffected firms take real actions to enhance corporate governance. Motivated by the SEC's concern about cybersecurity, I study the role of peer events in corporate governance using the setting of data breaches. While controlling for firm-specific time-varying unobservable characteristics, I find that peer data breaches are associated with a reduction in future internal control material weaknesses...
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作者：Li, Yijun; Ma, Mark (Shuai)
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：To ''crack down'' on tax havens and offshore financial centers, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has promoted an internationally agreed tax standard of exchange of information on request since 2009. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that the implementation of the standard significantly reduces aggressive tax avoidance by affected U.S. multinational firms with material subsidiaries in tax havens and other offshore financial centers. The effects ...
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作者：Bianchi, Pietro A.; Marra, Antonio; Masciandaro, Donato; Pecchiari, Nicola
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida International University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：We investigate how connections to organized crime manifest on firms??? financial statements and analyze the impact of these connections on firm performance outcomes. Using a unique dataset that identifies Italian firms connected to organized crime, we find that connected firms have lower profitability, even though they report higher sales and lower labor cost. Connected firms also have higher bank debt, report lower cash holdings, experience quicker operating cycles and are more likely to file...
