Are Tax Havens and Offshore Financial Centers Cracked Down On? A Study on the International Standard of Exchange of Information on Request

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Li, Yijun; Ma, Mark (Shuai)
• 署名单位: Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: ACCOUNTING REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0001-4826
• DOI: 10.2308/TAR-2019-0553
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 295-318
• 关键词: MULTINATIONAL-CORPORATIONS; US; avoidance; equity; FIRMS

摘要

To ''crack down'' on tax havens and offshore financial centers, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has promoted an internationally agreed tax standard of exchange of information on request since 2009. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we find that the implementation of the standard significantly reduces aggressive tax avoidance by affected U.S. multinational firms with material subsidiaries in tax havens and other offshore financial centers. The effects are stronger when firms have more incentives and opportunities for income-shifting or when tax enforcement is stronger. Overall, our study helps the OECD and other regulators better understand the effect of the internationally agreed standard on corporate tax avoidance.