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作者:Richard, Jacques
作者单位:Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine
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作者:Srinidhi, Bin N.; He, Shaohua; Firth, Michael
作者单位:University of Texas System; University of Texas Arlington; Lancaster University; Lingnan University
摘要:Family firms are characterized by less separation between ownership and control (Type 1 agency problem), but greater conflict of interest between controlling insiders and non-controlling outside investors (Type 2 agency problem). Although strong board governance is known to decrease the Type 1 agency problem, its effectiveness in mitigating the adverse consequences of the Type 2 agency problem has not been well documented in the literature. We show that strongly governed family firms are more ...
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作者:Lu, Hai; Wang, Kevin Q.; Wang, Xiaolu
作者单位:University of Toronto; Iowa State University
摘要:Motivated by investor disagreement and corporate disclosure literatures, we examine how stock price shocks affect future stock returns. We find that both large short-term price drops and hikes are followed by negative abnormal returns over the subsequent year, consistent with the conjecture that price shocks are useful indicators of intertemporal spikes in investor disagreement and investor opinion converges gradually. The asymmetric drifts involve return continuation for negative price shocks...
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作者:Liang, Lihong; Riedl, Edward J.
作者单位:Syracuse University; Boston University
摘要:This paper examines how the reporting model for a firm's operating assets affects analyst forecast accuracy. We contrast U.K. and U.S. investment property firms having real estate as their primary operating asset, exploiting that U.K. (U.S.) firms report these assets at fair value (historical cost). We assess the accuracy of a balance-sheet-based forecast (net asset value, or NAV) and an income-statement-based forecast (earnings per share, or EPS). We predict and find higher NAV forecast accur...
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作者:Chakravarthy, Jivas; deHaan, Ed; Rajgopal, Shivaram
作者单位:Chapman University System; Chapman University; Stanford University; Emory University
摘要:How do firms repair their reputations after a serious accounting restatement? To answer this question, we review firms' press releases and identify 1,765 reputation-building actions taken by: (1) 94 restating firms in the periods before and after their restatement; and (2) a set of matched control firms during contemporaneous periods. We posit that firms have incentives to target multiple stakeholders in a reputation repair strategy-including capital providers, customers, employees, and geogra...
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作者:Ramanna, Karthik; Sletten, Ewa
作者单位:Harvard University; Boston College
摘要:If the differences in accounting standards across countries reflect relatively stable institutional differences, why did several countries rapidly adopt IFRS in the 20032008 period? We test the hypothesis that perceived network benefits from the extant worldwide adoption of IFRS can explain part of a country's shift away from local accounting standards. We find that perceived network benefits increase the degree of IFRS harmonization among countries and that smaller countries have a differenti...
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作者:Feroz, Ehsan H.
作者单位:University of Washington; University of Washington Tacoma
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作者:Glover, Jonathan
作者单位:Carnegie Mellon University
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作者:Christensen, Peter O.; Qin, Zhenjiang
作者单位:Aarhus University; Southwestern University of Finance & Economics - China
摘要:In an incomplete market with heterogeneous prior beliefs, we show that public information can have a substantial impact on the ex ante cost of capital, trading volume, and investor welfare. The Pareto efficient public information system is the system enjoying the maximum ex ante cost of capital and the maximum expected abnormal trading volume. Imperfect public information increases the gains-to-trade based on heterogeneously updated posterior beliefs. In an exchange economy, this leads to high...
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作者:Indjejikian, Raffi J.; Matejka, Michal; Schloetzer, Jason D.
作者单位:University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Georgetown University