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作者：Chy, Mahfuz; Khurana, Inder K.; Kyung, Hoyoun
作者单位：University of Missouri System; University of Missouri Columbia
摘要：We examine the effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) regulatory oversight on private debt contracting outcomes, using the signing of the multilateral memorandum of understanding (MMoU) as a natural experiment. The MMoU enables the SEC to take stricter punitive actions against wealth expropriation by cross-listed firms' insiders and enforce better compliance with applicable rules and regulations. We find that enhanced SEC oversight in the post-MMoU regime lowers loan spreads ...
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作者：Cai, Wei; Chen, Yaxuan; Shin, Jee-Eun
作者单位：Columbia University; Cornell University; University of Toronto
摘要：Upward influencers, employees who are more favorably perceived by their supervisors than their peers and subordinates, are predicted by economic and accounting theories and are found to be ubiquitous in many organizations. Despite their prevalence, the role of upward influencers in teams remains underexplored. This paper fills this void by using proprietary data from a service-providing organization that allows for the identification of upward influencers based on its 360-degree person evaluat...
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作者：Huber, Stefan J.; Mcclure, Charles G.
作者单位：Rice University; University of Chicago
摘要：A significant portion of a merger's purchase price is allocated to goodwill. Currently, goodwill is not amortized but rather tested annually for impairment. When managers of acquiring firms care about earnings, goodwill's accounting treatment can have large effects on future earnings and may influence how much a manager will bid for a target company. We quantify the effects of goodwill accounting by estimating a structural model of corporate takeovers. Our estimates suggest accrual accounting ...
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作者：Lee, Seung y.; Marinovic, Ivan
作者单位：University of Southern Denmark; Stanford University
摘要：We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.
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作者：Valentine, Kristen; Zhang, Jenny li; Zheng, Yuxiang
作者单位：University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; University of British Columbia; Rutgers University System; Rutgers University Camden; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：We examine the impact of technological competition on voluntary innovation disclosure around the enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA). The AIA moves the US patent system from the first-to-invent to first-inventor-to-file system and induces a patent race that increases technological competition. Firms that are slow to file a patent are disadvantaged in this race. We find that focal firms with lagging patent classes strategically increase scientific publications in thei...
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作者：Huang, Sterling; Roychowdhury, Sugata; Sletten, Ewa; Xu, Yanping
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; Northwestern University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Sun Yat Sen University
摘要：We study the impact of social connections between judges and executives on the outcomes of Securities Class Action Litigation (SCAL). Judges who are socially connected to a firm's executives are significantly more likely to dismiss lawsuits against the firm. There is also evidence of faster resolution and lower payout amounts in connected cases. The favorable outcomes cannot be explained by the lower severity of connected cases, or by court, judge, or firm characteristics. Our results are more...
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作者：Breuer, Matthias; Dehaan, Ed
作者单位：Columbia University; Stanford University
摘要：Fixed effects (FE) have emerged as a ubiquitous and powerful tool for eliminating unwanted variation in observational accounting studies. Unwanted variation is plentiful in accounting research because we often use rich data to test precise hypotheses derived from abstract theories. By eliminating unwanted variation, FE reduce concerns that omitted variables bias our estimates or weaken test power. FE are not costless, though, so their use should be carefully justified by theoretical and instit...
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作者：De Franco, Gus; Guan, Yuyan; Zhou, Yibin; Zhu, Xindong
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Nanyang Technological University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; City University of Hong Kong
摘要：We exploit the staggered state-level adoption of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) to examine how banking deregulation and the resulting increase in bank competition affect firms' auditor choices. We find that an exogenous increase in the degree of interstate branch banking deregulation leads to a reduction in firms' propensity to engage a Big N or industry expert auditor. This main result, when combined with our cross-sectional analyses, offers evidence s...
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作者：Li, Bin; Wang, Annika yu
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; University of Houston System; University of Houston
摘要：This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high-pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitori...
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作者：Bloomfield, Matthew J.; Heinle, Mirko S.; Timmermans, Oscar
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：Many firms use relative stock performance to evaluate and incentivize their CEOs their. We document that such firms routinely disclose information that harms their peers' stock prices, and sometimes explicitly mention the harmed peers, by name, in these disclosures. Consistent with deliberate sabotage, peer-harming disclosures appear to be aimed at peers whose stock price depressions are most likely to benefit the disclosing firms' CEOs. The pricing effect of these disclosures does not reverse...
