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作者：Marra, Antonio; Pettinicchio, Angela; Shalev, Ron
作者单位：Bocconi University; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; Bocconi University; University of Toronto
摘要：We find that foreign-born CEOs are more inclined than domestic-born ones to acquire across borders, and that this inclination is explained by their preference for targets in their birth country. This preference is motivated by foreign-born CEOs' information advantage in their birth country and by these CEOs' desire to give back to the birth country. CEOs' desire to help their birth country also influences target location, increasing the likelihood of a target in countries that colonized the CE...
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作者：Sutherland, Andrew G.; Uckert, Matthias; Vetter, Felix W.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Amsterdam; University of Mannheim
摘要：We examine the staggered adoption of additional educational requirements (150-hour rule) for Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) to understand the effects of occupational licensing on minority participation in professional labor markets. The 150-hour rule increased the educational requirement for CPAs from 120 to 150 credit hours, effectively adding a fifth year of study. We find a 13% greater entry decline following the requirement's enactment for minority than nonminority CPA candidates. Our...
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作者：Li, Xuanbo; Lou, Yun; Zhang, Liandong
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Singapore Management University
摘要：We provide the first evidence that conflicts of interest arising from commercial ties lead to bias in environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings. Using the acquisitions of Vigeo Eiris and RobecoSAM by Moody's and S&P as shocks to the commercial ties between ESG rating agencies and their rated firms, we show that, after their acquisitions by the credit rating agencies (CRAs), ESG rating agencies issue higher ratings to existing paying clients of the CRAs. This effect is greater for fir...
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作者：Lin, Yan; Shen, Rui; Wang, Jasmine; Yu, Y. Julia
作者单位：University of Macau; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; University of Virginia
摘要：We study environmental and social (E&S) disclosures in annual reports. Using the word embedding model to examine over 210,000 annual reports from 24,271 public firms in 30 international countries/regions between 2001 and 2020, we create an E&S dictionary that allows us to document trends in annual report E&S disclosure. Specifically, we find: (1) increases in length and boilerplate language and (2) decreases in specificity. Our results also suggest that E&S disclosure quality improves after th...
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作者：Nathan, Brad
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick
摘要：This paper studies how a federal procurement regulation, known as the Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA), affects the competitiveness and execution of government contracts. TINA stipulates how contracting officials (COs) can ensure reasonable prices. Following TINA, for contracts above a certain size threshold, COs can no longer rely solely on their own judgment that a price is reasonable. Instead, they must either require suppliers to provide accounting data supporting their proposed prices or ...
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作者：Sran, Gurpal; Tuijn, Marcel; Vollon, Lauren
作者单位：New York University; Southern Methodist University; University of Notre Dame; Bocconi University
摘要：We study the capital market effects of information centralization by exploiting the staggered implementation of digital storage and access platforms for regulated financial information (Officially Appointed Mechanisms, or OAMs) in the European Union. We find that the implementation of OAMs results in significant improvements in capital market liquidity, consistent with the notion that OAMs lower investors' processing costs. The findings are more pronounced when processing costs are high to beg...
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作者：Raghunandan, Aneesh
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：I study whether firms that receive targeted U.S. state-level subsidies are more likely to subsequently engage in corporate misconduct. I find that firms are more likely to engage in misconduct in subsidizing states, but not in other states that they operate in, after receiving state subsidies. Using data on both federal and state enforcement actions, and exploiting the legal principle of dual sovereignty for identification, I show that this finding reflects an increase in the underlying rate o...
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作者：Chen, Hui; Liang, Pierre Jinghong; Petrov, Evgeny
作者单位：University of Zurich; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：We examine how financial disclosure policy affects a firm manager's strategy to innovate within a two-period bandit problem featuring two production methods: an old method with a known probability of success, and a new method with an unknown probability. Exploring the new method in the first period provides the manager with decision-useful information for the second period, thus creating a real option that is unavailable under exploiting the old known production method. Voluntary disclosure of...
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作者：Chen, Jade Huayu
作者单位：Loyola Marymount University
摘要：I examine whether employee-initiated lawsuits against an audit office adversely affect its ability to attract high-quality talent and deliver quality audits. I posit that employee lawsuits erode prospective employees' perceptions of an office, diminishing their willingness to join. Using a comprehensive data set of individual auditor profiles, I find a decline in the quality of newly hired auditors following an employee lawsuit. Cross-sectionally, the adverse effect of employee lawsuits on tal...
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作者：Xin, Xiangang; Yeung, P. Eric; Zhang, Zilong
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong; Cornell University; Zhejiang University
摘要：This study examines whether mandatory increase in reporting frequency exacerbates agency problems. Utilizing the setting of the 2004 SEC mandate on increased reporting frequency of mutual fund holdings, we show that increased reporting frequency elevates window dressing (buying winners or selling losers shortly before the end of the reporting period). This effect is driven by low-skill fund managers' incentives to generate mixed signals. Funds managed by low-skill managers experience lower ret...
