Dynamic Information Acquisition, Investment, and Disclosure

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lee, Seung y.; Marinovic, Ivan
• 署名单位: University of Southern Denmark; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0021-8456
• DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12610
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1547-1581
• 关键词: voluntary disclosure; reputation; MARKETS; FIRMS

摘要

We present a dynamic model of information acquisition and disclosure. The manager seeks to maximize future stock prices and collects information privately about the firm's fundamentals. Information acquisition increases the arrival rate of private information. The manager can choose to disclose his private information or withhold it in perpetuity. We study the impact of information acquisition on the accumulation of private information, disclosure, and the firm's initial investment.