The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blacconiere, Walter G.; Johnson, Marilyn F.; Lewis, Melissa F.
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; Michigan State University's Broad College of Business; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0165-4101
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.11.003
• 发表日期: 2008
• 关键词: performance; pay

摘要

We show that firms wit h executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs Of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC, Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC. (C) 2007 Published by Elsevier B.V.