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作者：Cohen, Maxime C.; Fiszer, Michael D.; Kim, Baek Jung
作者单位：McGill University; University of British Columbia
摘要：The service industry has become increasingly competitive. One of the main drivers for increasing profits and market share is service quality. When consumers encounter a bad experience, or a frustration, they may be tempted to stop using the service. In collaboration with the ride-sharing platform Via, our goal is to understand the benefits of proactively compensating customers who have experienced a frustration. Motivated by historical data, we consider two types of frustrations: long waiting ...
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作者：Galeotti, Fabio; Montero, Maria; Poulsen, Anders
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; CNRS - Institute for Humanities & Social Sciences (INSHS); University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We experimentally investigate, in an unstructured bargaining environment with commonly known money payoffs, the attraction effect and compromise effect (AE and CE) in bargaining, namely, a tendency for bargainers to agree to an intermediate option (CE) or to an option that dominates another option (AE). We conjecture that the relevance of the AE and CE in bargaining is constrained by how focal the feasible agreements' payoffs are. We indeed observe that there are significant AEs and CEs, but t...
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作者：Chao, Matthew; Larkin, Ian
作者单位：Williams College; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：Hospital and healthcare administrators name high prescription drug costs as one of their largest problems. A significant body of research demonstrates that meals and honoraria from pharmaceutical firms to physicians leads to higher prescribing of expensive, brand name drugs, despite little difference in efficacy. Some administrators and scholars have advocated for mandatory disclosure of these payments in order to reduce this conflict of interest, but many practitioners believe disclosure has ...
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作者：Elmachtoub, Adam N.; Grigas, Paul
作者单位：Columbia University; Columbia University; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Many real-world analytics problems involve two significant challenges: prediction and optimization. Because of the typically complex nature of each challenge, the standard paradigm is predict-then-optimize. By and large, machine learning tools are intended to minimize prediction error and do not account for how the predictions will be used in the downstream optimization problem. In contrast, we propose a new and very general framework, called Smart Predict, then Optimize (SPO), which directly ...
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作者：Alfaro, Laura; Faia, Ester; Lamersdorf, Nora; Saidi, Farzad
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Bonn
摘要：Social preferences facilitate the internalization of health externalities, for example, by reducing mobility during a pandemic. We test this hypothesis using mobility data from 258 cities worldwide alongside experimentally validated measures of social preferences. Controlling for time-varying heterogeneity that could arise at the level at which mitigation policies are implemented, we find that they matter less in regions that are more altruistic, patient, or exhibit less negative reciprocity. ...
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作者：Breugem, Thomas; Dollevoet, Twan; Huisman, Dennis
作者单位：INSEAD Business School; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Millions of employees around the world work in irregular rosters. The quality of these rosters is of utmost importance. High-quality rosters should be attractive on an individual level, but also divide the work fairly over the employees. We develop novel methodology to compute the trade-off between fairness and attractiveness in crew rostering. First, we propose an intuitive fairness scheme for crew rostering and analyze its theoretical performance. To do so, we introduce the approximate resou...
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作者：Gur, Yonatan; Macnamara, Gregory; Saban, Daniela
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study the design of sequential procurement strategies that integrate stochastic and strategic information. We consider a buyer who repeatedly demands a certain good and is unable to commit to long-term contracts. In each time period, the buyer makes a price offer to a seller who has private, persistent information regarding his or her cost and quality of provision. If the offer is accepted, the seller provides the good with a stochastic quality that is not contractible. Therefore, the buyer...
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作者：Wu, Yanhui; Zhu, Feng
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Harvard University
摘要：A growing number of people today are participating in the gig economy, working as independent contractors on short-term projects. We study the effects of competition on gig workers??? effort and creativity on a Chinese novel-writing platform. Authors produce and sell their works chapter by chapter under a revenue-sharing or pay-by-the-word contract with the platform. Exploiting a regulation that induced a massive entry of novels in the romance genre but not other genres, we find that, on avera...
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作者：Adelino, Manuel; Lewellen, Katharina; Ben McCartney, W.
作者单位：Duke University; Dartmouth College; Purdue University System; Purdue University
摘要：Financial constraints can cause firms to reduce product quality when quality is difficult to observe. We test this hypothesis in the context of medical choices at hospitals. Using heart attacks and child deliveries, we ask whether hospitals shift toward more profitable treatment options after a financial shock-the 2008 financial crisis. The crisis was followed by an unprecedented drop in hospital investments, yet the aggregate trends show no discrete shifts in treatment intensity post-2008. Fo...
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作者：He, Jing
作者单位：University of Delaware
摘要：This paper investigates the association of corporate reporting and executive network centrality, which measures an executive's relative position in a massive network consisting of outside corporate leaders. I find that high-centrality chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) are generally more likely to engage in financial misreporting than low-centrality CEOs and CFOs. I also find that the influence of CFO network centrality is greater than that of CEOs in financial...
