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作者：Li, Wanyi Dai; Ashlagi, Itai; Lo, Irene
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：Many countries have adopted payment for ecosystem services (PES) programs to reduce deforestation. Empirical evaluations find such programs, which pay forest owners to conserve forest, can lead to anywhere fromno impact to a 50% reduction in deforestation level. To better understand the potential effectiveness of PES contracts, we use a principal-agent model, in which the agent has an observable amount of initial forest land and a privately known baseline conservation level. Commonly used cond...
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作者：Arts, Sam; Cassiman, Bruno; Hou, Jianan
作者单位：KU Leuven; KU Leuven; University of Navarra; IESE Business School; Xiamen University
摘要：Although the rate of invention by firms and the effect on firm performance have been central themes in economics and strategy, the position and differentiation of invention by firms have received less attention. We develop a method to characterize a firm's technology portfolio based on the semantic content of patents that allows us to map a firm's unique spatial position relative to every other firm in technology space and to measure the overall differentiation of a firm's technology portfolio...
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作者：Shah, Eric D.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
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作者：Sundaresan, Suresh; Wang, Zhenyu
作者单位：Columbia University; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：Banks strategically choose and dynamically restructure deposits and nondeposit debt in response to the minimum requirements on total capital and tangible equity. We derive the optimal strategic liability structure and show that it minimizes the protection for deposits conditional on capital requirements. Although, given any liability structure, regulators can set capital requirements high enough to remove the incentive for risk substitution, the strategic response to the capital requirements a...
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作者：Chyz, James; Henry, Erin; Omer, Thomas; Wu, Biyu
作者单位：University of Tennessee System; University of Tennessee Knoxville; University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln
摘要：An IPO is a significant event for an individual firm, and the literature examining initial public offering (IPO) firms is extensive. However, there is little evidence on the subsequent effect of a significant IPO on incumbent firms. We extend this literature by using firms' tax policies as a powerful setting to identify whether incumbent firms respond to a significant IPO in their industry. Specifically, we use a first difference analysis to examine whether incumbent firms herd their effective...
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作者：Schneemeier, Jan
作者单位：Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：We explore a manager's incentives to disclose the precision of a signal about firm profitability. Voluntary disclosure of precision information encourages traders to acquire private information, increasing price informativeness and improving the firm's investment efficiency. We highlight a novel tradeoff: on the one hand, more precise public information crowds out traders' information acquisition by leveling the playing field. On the other hand, there can also be a crowding-in effect because h...
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作者：Choy, Siu Kai; Wei, Jason
作者单位：University of London; King's College London; University of Toronto; University Toronto Scarborough; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper examines the attention effect in the options market. We show that option investors (especially retail investors) buy more calls and puts on both daily winner and loser stocks, and this buying pressure leads to an overvaluation, as shown in subsequent lower hedged returns. The overvaluation is due to a combination of differences of opinion, risk aversion, and margin requirements. The economic magnitude is large. For instance, a zero-financing portfolio involving options on loser stoc...
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作者：Dietzenbacher, Bas J.; Kondratev, Aleksei Y.
作者单位：Maastricht University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：Given the ranking of competitors, how should the prize endowment be allocated? This paper introduces and axiomatically studies the prize allocation problem. We focus on consistent prize allocation rules satisfying elementary solidarity and fairness principles. In particular, we derive several families of rules satisfying anonymity, order preservation, and endowment monotonicity, which all fall between the equal division rule and the winnertakes-all rule. Our results may help organizers to sele...
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作者：Gao, Long
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside
摘要：We study a compensation problem for salespeople with learning potential. In our model, both the firm and sales agent are risk neutral and forward-looking; the agent can privately observe his skill, exert effort, and learn from experience; the firm can learn from the agent's choice and revise sales targets over time. The problem entails a dynamic tradeoff between exploiting learning, screening information, and maximizing efficiency. We find the optimal compensation plan differs substantially fr...
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作者：Buser, Thomas; Yuan, Huaiping
作者单位：University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：Fear of public speaking is very common, but we know little about its implications for individuals and organizations. We establish public speaking aversion as an economically relevant preference using three steps. First, we use laboratory and classroom experiments to show that preferences for speaking in public vary strongly across individuals with many participants willing to give up significant amounts of money to avoid giving a short presentation in front of an audience. Second, we introduce...
