Fair and Consistent Prize Allocation in Competitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dietzenbacher, Bas J.; Kondratev, Aleksei Y.
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2022.4520
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 3319-3339
• 关键词: fair allocation; rank-order tournament; prize structure; Tournament design; axiomatic analysis; Consistency

摘要

Given the ranking of competitors, how should the prize endowment be allocated? This paper introduces and axiomatically studies the prize allocation problem. We focus on consistent prize allocation rules satisfying elementary solidarity and fairness principles. In particular, we derive several families of rules satisfying anonymity, order preservation, and endowment monotonicity, which all fall between the equal division rule and the winnertakes-all rule. Our results may help organizers to select the most suitable prize allocation rule for rank-order competitions.