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作者：van den Assem, Martijn J.; van Dolder, Dennie; Thaler, Richard H.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Erasmus University Rotterdam; University of Chicago
摘要：We examine cooperative behavior when large sums of money are at stake, using data from the television game show Golden Balls. At the end of each episode, contestants play a variant on the classic prisoner's dilemma for large and widely ranging stakes averaging over $20,000. Cooperation is surprisingly high for amounts that would normally be considered consequential but look tiny in their current context, what we call a big peanuts phenomenon. Utilizing the prior interaction among contestants, ...
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作者：Lai, Guoming; Xiao, Wenqiang; Yang, Jun
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; New York University; Huazhong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general, single buyback contract. We show that the buyer's stocking decision can be distorted in equilibrium. Such a downstream stocking distortion hurts the buyer firm's own performance, and it also influences the performances of the supplier and the su...
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作者：Celen, Bogachan; Hyndman, Kyle
作者单位：Columbia University; Maastricht University
摘要：This paper provides a test of a theory of social learning through endogenous information acquisition. A group of subjects face a decision problem under uncertainty. Subjects are endowed with private information about the fundamentals of the problem and make decisions sequentially. The key feature of the experiment is that subjects can observe the decisions of predecessors by forming links at a cost. The model predicts that the average welfare is enhanced in the presence of a small cost. Our ex...
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作者：Ju, Nengjiu; Wan, Xuhu
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; Shanghai Jiao Tong University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies the optimal contract between risk-neutral shareholders and a constant relative risk-aversion manager in a continuous-time model. Several interesting results are obtained. First, the optimal compensation is increasing but concave in output value if the manager is more risk averse than a log-utility manager. Second, when the manager has a log utility, a linear contract is optimal when there is no explicit lower bound on the compensation, and an option contract is optimal when ...
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作者：Chen, Yefen; Su, Xuanming; Zhao, Xiaobo
作者单位：Tsinghua University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We consider a supply chain with a single supplier and two retailers. The retailers choose their orders strategically, and if their orders exceed the supplier's capacity, quantities are allocated proportionally to the orders. We experimentally study the capacity allocation game using subjects motivated by financial incentives. We find that the Nash equilibrium, which assumes that players are perfectly rational, substantially exaggerates retailers' tendency to strategically order more than they ...
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作者：Tambe, Prasanna; Hitt, Lorin M.; Brynjolfsson, Erik
作者单位：New York University; University of Pennsylvania; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We gather detailed data on organizational practices and information technology (IT) use at 253 firms to examine the hypothesis that external focus-the ability of a firm to detect and therefore respond to changes in its external operating environment-increases returns to IT, especially when combined with decentralized decision making. First, using survey-based measures, we find that external focus is correlated with both organizational decentralization, and IT investment. Second, we find that a...
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作者：Lau, Sie Ting; Ng, Lilian; Zhang, Bohui
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Milwaukee; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper examines whether and how differences in investors' information environments (measured by a country's information disclosure, accounting standards, and financial transparency) are related to cross-country differences in the market risk premium volatility. We use the vector-autoregressive and implied cost of capital methods to extract time variation in risk premiums for 41 developed and emerging markets worldwide. Consistent with theoretical predictions, countries with better informat...
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作者：Posen, Hart E.; Levinthal, Daniel A.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A common justification for organizational change is that the circumstances in which the organization finds itself have changed, thereby eroding the value of utilizing existing knowledge. On the surface, the claim that organizations should adapt by generating new knowledge seems obvious and compelling. However, this standard wisdom overlooks the possibility that the reward to generating new knowledge may itself be eroded if change is an ongoing property of the environment. This observation in t...
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作者：Overby, Eric; Clarke, Jonathan
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology
摘要：Despite the central role of arbitrage in finance and economic theory, there is limited evidence of the factors that create and eliminate arbitrage opportunities, how often arbitrage occurs, and how profitable it is. We address these gaps via a transaction-level analysis of spatial arbitrage in the wholesale automotive market. We investigate why arbitrage opportunities are created by analyzing how sellers choose where to sell vehicles. We find that the attention sellers pay to the distribution ...
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作者：Kuhnen, Camelia M.; Tymula, Agnieszka
作者单位：Northwestern University; New York University
摘要：We examine whether private feedback about relative performance can mitigate moral hazard in competitive environments by modifying the agents' self-esteem. In our experimental setting, people work harder and expect to rank better when told that they may learn their ranking, relative to cases when feedback will not be provided. Individuals who ranked better than expected decrease output but expect a better rank in the future, whereas those who ranked worse than expected increase output but lower...
