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作者：Roberts, Peter W.; Sterling, Adina D.
作者单位：Emory University; Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：Entrepreneurs that were employed by successful industry incumbents prior to founding tend to confer advantages on their new organizations. We propose and then demonstrate a similar network progeny effect rooted in the social relationships that form among entrepreneurs. Our analysis of new entrants into the Ontario wine industry shows that prefounding friendship ties of the founders of one especially prominent entrepreneurial firm led to significantly higher ice wine prices. This attests to the...
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作者：Chabi-Yo, Fousseni
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：I derive pricing kernels in which the market volatility is endogenously determined. Using the Taylor expansion series of the representative investor's marginal utility, I show that the price of market volatility risk is restricted by the investor's risk aversion and skewness preference. The risk aversion is estimated to be between two and five and is significant. The price of the market volatility is negative. Consistent with economic theory, I find that the pricing kernel decreases in the mar...
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作者：Forman, Chris; van Zeebroeck, Nicolas
作者单位：University System of Georgia; Georgia Institute of Technology; Solvay SA; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：How did the diffusion of the Internet influence research collaborations within firms? We examine the relationship between business use of basic Internet technology and the size and geographic composition of industrial research teams between 1992 and 1998. We find robust empirical evidence that basic Internet adoption is associated with an increased likelihood of collaborative patents from geographically dispersed teams. On the contrary, we find no evidence of such a link between Internet adopt...
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作者：Cohen, Lauren; Frazzini, Andrea; Malloy, Christopher J.
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：We provide evidence that firms appoint independent directors who are overly sympathetic to management, while still technically independent according to regulatory definitions. We explore a subset of independent directors for whom we have detailed, microlevel data on their views regarding the firm prior to being appointed to the board: sell-side analysts who are subsequently appointed to the boards of companies they previously covered. We find that boards appoint overly optimistic analysts who ...
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作者：Goette, Lorenz; Huffman, David; Meier, Stephan; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Swarthmore College; Columbia University; University of Innsbruck; University of Gothenburg
摘要：Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and...
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作者：de Figueiredo, John M.; Silverman, Brian S.
作者单位：Duke University; Duke University; Duke University; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper examines how the density and governance of vertically related populations affect the life chances of organizations. We integrate the literatures on organizational ecology and vertical integration to develop a theory of how (1) specialized upstream industries affect downstream survival rates, (2) the prevalence of different governance forms among upstream and downstream organizations moderates this relationship, and (3) different forms of governance exert differential competitive pre...
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作者：Lee, Hsiao-Hui; Pinker, Edieal J.; Shumsky, Robert A.
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; University of Rochester; Dartmouth College
摘要：This paper studies outsourcing decisions for a two-level service process in which the first level serves as a 1 gatekeeper for a second level of experts. The objective of the system operator (the client) is to minimize the sum of staffing costs, customer waiting costs, and mistreatment costs due to unsuccessful attempts by a gatekeeper to solve the customer's problem. The client may outsource all or part of the process to a vendor, and first-best contracts exist when the client outsources only...
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作者：Pierce, Lamar
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：This paper argues that conflicting incentives among managers may impede potential knowledge-sharing benefits from vertical integration. I study knowledge-based agency costs from vertical integration in car leasing, where manufacturer-owned captive lessors compete with independent lessors. Both organizational forms must acquire and integrate diffuse knowledge to accurately predict vehicle depreciation-a condition critical for profitability. Using a data set of 180,000 leases, I compare contract...
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作者：Ross, David Gaddis
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：This paper uses a formal model to study how evaluation costs affect competition for resources in strategic factor markets. It finds that relative scarcity may not always benefit resource sellers. Rather, when competition among resource investors passes a certain threshold intensity, miscoordination among investors increases to the point that sellers' expected profits decline. This paper extends the model to consider how investors organize to overcome managerial agency in resource evaluation. T...
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作者：Seamans, Robert C.
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This article investigates how private firms respond to potential entry from public firms. This paper uses a data set of over 3,000 U.S. cable TV systems to present evidence consistent with entry deterrence. incumbent cable TV firms upgrade faster when located in markets with a potential municipal entrant. However, the same systems are then slower to offer new products enabled by the upgrade, suggesting upgrades in these markets occur for strategic reasons. Incumbent cable systems also upgrade ...
