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作者：Hegde, Deepak; Sampat, Bhaven
作者单位：New York University; Columbia University
摘要：Private interest groups lobby politicians to influence public policy. However, little is known about how lobbying influences the policy decisions made by federal agencies. We study this through examining lobbying by advocacy groups associated with rare diseases for funding by the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the world's largest funder of biomedical research. Disease group lobbying for NIH funding has been controversial, with critics alleging that it distorts public funding toward resea...
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作者：Bikard, Michael; Murray, Fiona; Gans, Joshua S.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Toronto
摘要：When do scientists and other innovators organize into collaborative teams, and why do they do so for some projects and not others? At the core of this important organizational choice is, we argue, a trade-off scientists make between the productive efficiency of collaboration and the credit allocation that arises after the completion of collaborative work. In this paper, we explore this trade-off by developing a model to structure our understanding of the factors shaping researcher collaborativ...
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作者：Li, Jimmy Q.; Rusmevichientong, Paat; Simester, Duncan; Tsitsiklis, John N.; Zoumpoulis, Spyros I.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Southern California; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); INSEAD Business School
摘要：The feasibility of using field experiments to optimize marketing decisions remains relatively unstudied. We investigate category pricing decisions that require estimating a large matrix of cross-product demand elasticities and ask the following question: How many experiments are required as the number of products in the category grows? Our main result demonstrates that if the categories have a favorable structure, we can learn faster and reduce the number of experiments that are required: the ...
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作者：Bertomeu, Jeremy; Liang, Pierre Jinghong
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines voluntary disclosures in a repeated oligopoly and their association with price-setting behavior and industry profits along industrial fluctuations. The analysis focuses on the collectively optimal equilibrium among oligopoly firms. We show that, in industries that are highly concentrated or feature low cost of capital, nondisclosure is prevalent and results in stable product prices and high profit margins. Otherwise, firms may selectively disclose to soften competition in t...
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作者：Cao, Ying; Dhaliwal, Dan; Li, Zengquan; Yang, Yong George
作者单位：Chinese University of Hong Kong; University of Arizona; Korea University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the impact of social networks on the ability of independent directors to obtain private information from their firms' executives. We find that independent directors socially connected to their firms' senior executives earn significantly higher returns than unconnected independent directors in stock sales transactions. The network effect on independent directors' trading profitability is stronger in firms with higher information asymmetry and with more powerful executives. In addition,...
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作者：Newton, David; Simutin, Mikhail
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; University of Toronto
摘要：This paper shows that the gender and age of the wage setter are crucial determinants of the disparity in wages between sexes. We document our findings using a data set on compensation of corporate officers that is uniquely suited for this analysis because officer wages are set by chief executive officers (CEOs). We show that CEOs pay officers of the opposite gender less than officers of their own gender, even when controlling for job characteristics. Older and male CEOs exhibit the greatest pr...
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作者：Wei, Kelsey D.; Wermers, Russ; Yao, Tong
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park; University of Iowa
摘要：Motivated by extant theories of herding behavior, this paper empirically identifies contrarian mutual funds as those trading most frequently against the crowd. We find that contrarian funds generate superior performance both when they trade against and with the herd, indicating that they possess superior private information. Furthermore, contrarians do not trade in a particularly correlated fashion with each other, consistent with these funds having disparate information. Our fund-level contra...
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作者：Goldman, Eitan Moshe; Huang, Peggy Peiju
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Tulane University
摘要：Using hand-collected data, we document the details of the ex ante severance contracts and the ex post separation pay given to S&P 500 chief executive officers (CEOs) upon departing from their companies. We analyze what determines whether or not a CEO receives separation pay in excess of the amount specified in the severance contract. We find that discretionary separation pay is given to about 40% of departing CEOs and is, on average, $8 million, which amounts to close to 242% of a CEO's annual...
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作者：Feng, Qi; Lai, Guoming; Lu, Lauren Xiaoyuan
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product. Both firms are impatient, and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached. The buyer is privately informed about his type, which can be high or low: the high type's demand is stochastically larger than the low type's. In the dynamic negotiation process, the seller can screen, whereas the buyer can signal information through their offers, and the buyer ha...
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作者：Wang, Yudong; Wu, Chongfeng; Yang, Li
作者单位：Shanghai Jiao Tong University; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：This paper investigates out-of-sample performance of the naive hedging strategy relative to that of the minimum variance hedging strategy, in which the covariance parameters are estimated from 18 econometric models. Hedging performance is compared across 24 futures markets. Our main findings suggest that it is difficult to find a strategy under the minimum variance framework that outperforms the naive hedging strategy both consistently and significantly. Our findings are robust to different sa...
