Profit Sharing and Peer Reporting

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Carpenter, Jeffrey; Robbett, Andrea; Akbar, Prottoy A.
• 署名单位: Middlebury College; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0025-1909
• DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2017.2831
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 4261-4276
• 关键词: Team production; profit sharing; peer reporting; RECIPROCITY; experiment

摘要

Despite the 1/N problem associated with profit sharing, the empirical literature finds that sharing profits with workers has a positive impact on work team and firm performance. We examine one possible resolution to this puzzle by observing that, although the incentive to work harder under profit sharing is weak, it might be sufficient to motivate workers to report each other for shirking, especially if the workers are reciprocally minded. Our model provides the rationale for this conjecture, and we discuss the results of an experiment finding that workers who share in firm profits are more willing to provide accurate information about their peers to management and that profit sharing is most effective when peer reporting is possible.