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作者：Bernard, Darren; Ge, Weili; Matsumoto, Dawn; Toynbee, Sara
作者单位：University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We present evidence that although individuals with accounting expertise bring key skills to the financial reporting responsibilities of the chief financial officer (CFO) position, they tend to lack educational and career experiences relevant to nonaccounting responsibilities (e.g., operations and strategy). Assuming boards' perceptions of CFO accounting expertise are correct on average, we provide evidence of tradeoffs of CFO accounting expertise by examining how differences in CFO backgrounds...
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作者：Chen, Yingshan; Dai, Min; Goncalves-Pinto, Luis; Xu, Jing; Yan, Cheng
作者单位：South China University of Technology; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; University of New South Wales Sydney; Chinese University of Hong Kong; Renmin University of China; University of Essex
摘要：We examine the problem of an investor who trades in a market with unobservable regime shifts. The investor learns from past prices and is subject to transaction costs. Our model generates significantly larger liquidity premia compared with a benchmark model with observable market shifts. The larger premia are driven primarily by suboptimal risk exposure, as turnover is lower under incomplete information. In contrast, the benchmark model produces (mechanically) high turnover and heavy trading c...
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作者：Henderson, Rebecca
作者单位：Harvard University
摘要：Understanding the process of innovation has been a central concern of management researchers, but despite this progress, there remains much that we do not understand. Deepening our knowledge is critically important given the enormous environmental and social challenges we face as a society. Pursing incremental innovation will continue to be hugely important, but this paper argues that building a richer understanding of architectural or systemic innovation will also be crucial. This paper sugge...
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作者：Black, Dirk E.; Vance, Marshall D.
作者单位：University of Nebraska System; University of Nebraska Lincoln; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：This paper examines whether and for how long managers' initial assessments of employee ability influence promotion decisions. Using archival data from minor league professional baseball, we find that, controlling for performance, initial assessments are associated with promotion decisions for at least six years after the initial assessments were made. We also find that initial assessments are positively associated with future performance at the outset of a player's career, but the association ...
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作者：Fehrler, Sebastian; Janas, Moritz
作者单位：University of Bremen; University of Konstanz
摘要：We study the choice of a principal to either delegate a decision to a group of careerist experts or to consult them individually and keep the decision-making power. Our model predicts a trade-off between information acquisition and information aggregation. On the one hand, the expected benefit from being informed is larger in case the experts are consulted individually. Hence, the experts either acquire the same or a larger amount of information, depending on the cost of information, than in c...
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作者：Dai, Tinglong; Ke, Rongzhu; Ryan, Christopher Thomas
作者单位：Johns Hopkins University; Zhejiang University; University of British Columbia
摘要：A firm hires an agent (e.g., a store manager) to undertake both operational and marketing tasks. Marketing tasks boost demand, but for demand to translate into sales, operational effort is required to maintain adequate inventory. The firm designs a compensation plan to induce the agent to put effort into both marketing and operations while facing demand censoring (i.e., demand in excess of available inventory is unobservable). We formulate this incentive-design problem in a principal-agent fra...
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作者：Burbano, Vanessa C.
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：Despite a recent surge in corporate activism, with firm leaders communicating about social-political issues unrelated to their core businesses, we know little about its strategic implications. This paper examines the effect of an employer communicating a stance about a social-political issue on employee motivation, using a two-phase, preregistered field experiment in an online labor market platform. Results demonstrate an asymmetric treatment effect of taking a stance depending on whether the ...
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作者：Dutta, Sunil; Reichelstein, Stefan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Mannheim; Stanford University
摘要：This paper examines the theoretical properties of full-cost transfer prices in multidivisional firms. In our model, divisional managers are responsible for the initial acquisition of productive capacity and the utilization of that capacity in subsequent periods, once operational uncertainty has been resolved. We examine alternative variants of full-cost transfer pricing with the property that the discounted sum of transfer payments is equal to the initial capacity acquisition cost and the pres...
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作者：Haugh, Martin B.; Singal, Raghav
作者单位：Imperial College London; Columbia University
摘要：Daily fantasy sports (DFS) is a multibillion-dollar industry with millions of annual users and widespread appeal among sports fans across a broad range of popular sports. Building on recent work, we provide a coherent framework for constructing DFS portfolios where we explicitly model the behavior of other DFS players. We formulate an optimization problem that accurately describes the DFS problem for a risk-neutral decision maker in both double-up and top-heavy payoff settings. Our formulation...
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作者：Beer, Ruth; Rios, Ignacio; Saban, Daniela
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Stanford University
摘要：Motivated by recent initiatives to increase transparency in procurement, we study the effects of disclosing information about previous purchases in a setting where an organization delegates its purchasing decisions to its employees. When employees can use their own discretion, which may be influenced by personal preferences, to select a supplier, the incentives of the employees and the organization may be misaligned. Disclosing information about previous purchasing decisions made by other empl...
