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作者：Igami, Mitsuru; Yang, Nathan
作者单位：Yale University; McGill University
摘要：We develop a dynamic entry model of multi-store oligopoly with heterogeneous markets, and estimate it using data on hamburger chains in Canada (1970-2005). Because more lucrative markets attract more entry, firms appear to favor the presence of more rivals. Thus unobserved heterogeneity across geographical markets creates an endogeneity problem and poses a methodological challenge in the estimation of dynamic games, which we address by combining the procedures proposed by Kasahara and Shimotsu...
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作者：Patacchini, Eleonora; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：Cornell University; Sapienza University Rome; Monash University
摘要：We analyze the intergenerational transmission of the strength of religion focusing on the interplay between family and social influences. We find that parental investment in transmitting religious values and peers' religiousity are complements. The relative importance of these socialization factors depends on the religiosity of the parents.
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作者：Aradillas-Lopez, Andres; Gandhi, Amit
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We study the estimation of static games where players are allowed to have ordered actions, such as the number of stores to enter into a market. Assuming that payoff functions satisfy general shape restrictions, we show that equilibrium of the game implies a covariance restriction between each player's action and a component of the player's payoff function that we call the strategic index. The strategic index captures the direction of strategic interaction (i. e., patterns of substitutability o...
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作者：Hull, Isaiah
作者单位：Sveriges Riksbank
摘要：I study financial product innovation in a model with two classes of agents: sophisticated and unsophisticated. Unsophisticated agents are hit with frictions that lower the return to a conventional asset they hold. Sophisticated agents construct financial innovations that are perfect substitutes for the conventional asset, but are not subject to the friction. In the absence of complete information, unsophisticated agents learn about innovations through a contagion process, as they encounter com...
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作者：Chiong, Khai Xiang; Galichon, Alfred; Shum, Matt
作者单位：University of Southern California; University of Southern California; New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); California Institute of Technology
摘要：Using results from Convex Analysis, we investigate a novel approach to identification and estimation of discrete-choice models that we call the mass transport approach. We show that the conditional choice probabilities and the choice-specific payoffs in these models are related in the sense of conjugate duality, and that the identification problem is a mass transport problem. Based on this, we propose a new two-step estimator for these models; interestingly, the first step of our estimator inv...
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作者：Blau, David M.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：This paper specifies a life cycle model of saving and employment and uses it to analyze crowd out of private household saving by public and private pensions. Some parameters of the model are estimated and others are calibrated to match life cycle employment and asset profiles, and Social Security claiming decisions. Simulation results indicate that defined benefit (DB) and defined contribution (DC) pensions on average crowd out household wealth by $0.09 and $0.37 per dollar of pension wealth, ...
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作者：Escanciano, Juan Carlos; Jacho-Chavez, David; Lewbel, Arthur
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; Emory University; Boston College
摘要：Let H-0(X) be a function that can be nonparametrically estimated. Suppose E[Y vertical bar X] = F-0[X-inverted perpendicular beta(0), H-0(X)]. Many models fit this framework, including latent index models with an endogenous regressor and nonlinear models with sample selection. We show that the vector beta(0) and unknown function F-0 are generally point identified without exclusion restrictions or instruments, in contrast to the usual assumption that identification without instruments requires ...
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作者：Jorgensen, Thomas H.
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：Conventional estimators based on the consumption Euler equation, intensively used in studies of intertemporal consumption behavior, produce biased estimates of the effect of children on the marginal utility of consumption if consumers face credit constraints. As a more constructive contribution, I propose a tractable approach to obtaining bounds on the effect of children on the marginal utility of consumption. I estimate these bounds using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and find that conve...
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作者：Barseghyan, Levon; Molinari, Francesca; Teitelbaum, Joshua C.
作者单位：Cornell University; Georgetown University
摘要：We leverage the assumption that preferences are stable across contexts to partially identify and conduct inference on the parameters of a structural model of risky choice. Working with data on households' deductible choices across three lines of insurance coverage and a model that nests expected utility theory plus a range of non-expected utility models, we perform a revealed preference analysis that yields household-specific bounds on the model parameters. We then impose stability and other s...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Wilson, Alistair J.; Yariv, Leeat
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley (1962) mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently ...
