Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: An experimental study

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Wilson, Alistair J.; Yariv, Leeat
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
• 刊物名称: QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1759-7323
• DOI: 10.3982/QE496
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 449-482
• 关键词: Deferred acceptance; STABILITY; experiments; centralized matching

摘要

We experimentally study the Gale and Shapley (1962) mechanism, which is utilized in a wide set of applications, most prominently the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP). Several insights come out of our analysis. First, only 48% of our observed outcomes are stable, and among those a large majority culminate at the receiver-optimal stable matching. Second, receivers rarely truncate their true preferences: it is the proposers who do not make offers in order of their preference, frequently skipping potential partners. Third, market characteristics affect behavior: both the cardinal representation and core size influence whether laboratory outcomes are stable. We conclude by using our controlled results and a behavioral model to shed light on a number of stylized facts we derive from new NRMP survey and outcome data, and to explain the small cores previously documented for the NRMP.