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作者：Egorov, Georgy; Sonin, Konstantin
作者单位：Northwestern University; New Economic School
摘要：The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that al...
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作者：Dal Bo, Ernesto; Dal Bo, Pedro
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Brown University
摘要：We incorporate appropriation activities ( social conflict) into canonical models of trade and study how economic shocks and policies affect the intensity of conflict. We show that not all shocks that could make society richer reduce conflict: positive shocks to labor-intensive industries diminish conflict, while positive shocks to capital-intensive industries increase it. The key requirement is that conflict activities be more labor intensive than the economy as this determines how shocks affe...
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作者：Guiso, Luigi; Schivardi, Fabiano
作者单位：European University Institute; University of Cagliari
摘要：We contrast two potential explanations of the substantial differences in entrepreneurial activity observed across geographical areas: entry costs and external effects. We extend the Lucas model of entrepreneurship to allow for heterogeneous entry costs and for externalities that shift the distribution of entrepreneurial talents. We show that these assumptions have opposite predictions on the relation between entrepreneurial activity and firm-level TFP: with different entry costs, in areas with...
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作者：Decreuse, Bruno; Zylberberg, Andre
作者单位：Aix-Marseille Universite; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
摘要：We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogeneous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job seekers while homogeneous unemployed workers invest in costly job seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job seekers. The search market is continuously segmented by wage level, individuals can spread their search investment over the different submarkets, and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns in each su...
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作者：Alesina, Alberto; Giuliano, Paola
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：We establish an inverse relationship between family ties and political participation, such that the more individuals rely on the family as a provider of services, insurance, and transfer of resources, the lower is one's civic engagement and political participation. We also show that strong family ties appear to be a substitute for generalized trust, rather than a complement to it. These three constructs-civic engagement, political participation, and trust-are part of what is known as social ca...
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作者：Devereux, Michael B.; Sutherland, Alan
作者单位：University of British Columbia; University of St Andrews
摘要：This paper develops a simple approximation method for computing equilibrium portfolios in dynamic general equilibrium open economy macro-models. The method is widely applicable, simple to implement, and gives analytical solutions for equilibrium portfolio positions in any combination or types of asset. It can be used in models with any number of assets, whether markets are complete or incomplete, and can be applied to stochastic dynamic general equilibrium models of any dimension, so long as t...
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作者：Chiappori, Pierre-Andre; Paiella, Monica
作者单位：Columbia University; University of Naples Federico II
摘要：Most classical tests of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) based on individual portfolio composition use cross-sectional data. Such tests must assume that the distributions of wealth and preferences are independent. We use panel data to analyze how individuals portfolio allocation between risky and riskless assets varies in response to changes in total financial wealth. We find the elasticity of the risky asset share to wealth to be small and statistically insignificant, supporting the CRR...
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作者：Stiglitz, Joseph E.
作者单位：Columbia University
摘要：The standard macroeconomic models have failed, by all the most important tests of scientific theory. They did not predict that the financial crisis would happen; and when it did, they understated its effects. Monetary authorities allowed bubbles to grow and focused on keeping inflation low, partly because the standard models suggested that low inflation was necessary and almost sufficient for efficiency and growth. After the crisis broke, policymakers relying on the models floundered. Notwiths...
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作者：Dohmen, Thomas; Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Sunde, Uwe; Schupp, Juergen; Wagner, Gert G.
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Bonn; Swarthmore College; University of St Gallen; Leibniz Association; DIW Berlin - Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung; Free University of Berlin; Max Planck Society
摘要：This paper studies risk attitudes using a large representative survey and a complementary experiment conducted with a representative subject pool in subjects' homes. Using a question asking people about their willingness to take risks in general, we find that gender, age, height, and parental background have an economically significant impact on willingness to take risks. The experiment confirms the behavioral validity of this measure, using paid lottery choices. Turning to other questions abo...
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作者：Gollier, Christian; Schlee, Edward
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：We determine how better information affects the average equity premium in a standard representative-agent exchange economy. Perfect information obviously eliminates the equity premium, and a particular kind of information about the level of future consumption always lowers the average equity premium. Surprisingly, information sometimes raises the average equity premium, no matter what the preferences of the representative agent. Information purely about the volatility either of consumption or ...
