SEARCH INTENSITY, DIRECTED SEARCH, AND THE WAGE DISTRIBUTION

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Decreuse, Bruno; Zylberberg, Andre
• 署名单位: Aix-Marseille Universite; heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1542-4766
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01039.x
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 1168-1186
• 关键词: model; job; dispersion; WORKER; offers

摘要

We propose a search equilibrium model in which homogeneous firms post wages along with a vacancy to attract job seekers while homogeneous unemployed workers invest in costly job seeking. The key innovation relies on the organization of the search market and the search behavior of the job seekers. The search market is continuously segmented by wage level, individuals can spread their search investment over the different submarkets, and search intensity has marginal decreasing returns in each submarket. We demonstrate the existence of a nondegenerate equilibrium wage distribution. The density of this wage distribution is increasing at low wages and decreasing at high wages. The distribution can be right-tailed, and, under additional restrictions, is hump-shaped. Our results are illustrated by an example generating a Beta wage distribution.