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作者：SaintPaul, G
作者单位：Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies a model of human capital accumulation with real wage rigidity. It is shown that the arbitrage condition between hiring a skilled vs. an unskilled worker may be stated as a positive relationship between their relative unemployment rates. It may be the case that this locus is steep enough to generate increasing returns to education. This may lead to multiple equilibria: a high-education equilibrium may co-exist with a low-education equilibrium. In the former, the unskilled are...
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作者：Frey, BS; Eichenberger, R
摘要：Neoclassical public economists stress economic distortions induced by differential taxation and therefore favour harmonization; political economists focus on political distortions and therefore reject harmonization. However, policy choices on the possibility frontier between economic and political distortions tend to be biased: economic advisers, politicians and interest groups typically favour harmonization. Harmonization is, moreover, undermined by incentives to re-establish tax differences....
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作者：Kolstad, CD
摘要：This paper concerns the irreversibility effect in stock externalities. In an environment of uncertainty with learning taking place, one may wish to under-emit today to avoid potential environmental irreversibilities. Alternatively, one may wish to under-invest in pollution control capital, avoiding investments in sunk capital that turn out to be wasted. The paper develops theoretical results on the tension between these two effects and separates risk aversion from the irreversibility effect. T...
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作者：Correia, IH
作者单位：Universidade Catolica Portuguesa
摘要：This paper provides a new economic interpretation of the well-known dynamic optimal taxation principle that capital income should not be taxed in the steady state. We show that the result is related to the minimization of distortions at the intratemporal margin. When every factor of production can be taxed at the optimal rate, capital income should not be taxed in the steady state. But when there are restrictions on the taxation of production factors, the tax rate on capital income in the stea...
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作者：Chen, Y; Plott, CR
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：The Groves-Ledyard mechanism theoretically can solve the 'free-rider' problem in public good provision in certain environments. Two questions are of overriding importance in implementing the mechanism. The first is related to the actual performance of the mechanism in general. The second is the choice of a 'punishment parameter', gamma, which is the only parameter that is available for those who may want to actually use the mechanism. Thus the determination of the role of this variable on mech...
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作者：Quirmbach, HC; Swenson, CW; Vines, CC
作者单位：University of Southern California; Iowa State University; University of Arizona
摘要：Tax incidence is examined in an experimental general equilibrium production micro economy. Consistent with predictions, the imposition of a tax on corporate capital resulted in a flow of capital out of the corporate sector, decreased corporate usage of capital relative to labor, and tax-shifting through decreases in the relative prices of capital and non-corporate output. Although capital owners were able to shift some of the tax burden, the corporate tax resulted in a 35% drop in capital owne...
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作者：Brennan, G; Pincus, JJ
作者单位：University of Adelaide; Australian National University
摘要：This paper shows that 'flypaper effects' can be observed for unconditional federal grants, even in the absence of agenda-setters, voting intransitivities, informational asymmetries, etc. In a simple representation of a regime of federal, general revenue grants, median citizen-voters are decisive over the levels of grants, taxation and spending. By assumption, federal grants received equal federal taxes paid in each recipient locality. The size of the federal grant varies endogenously with dema...
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作者：Sefton, M; Steinberg, R
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; Purdue University in Indianapolis
摘要：We contrast results from a laboratory experiment in voluntary contributions for a public good using two reward structures with interior equilibria. The first induces a set of Nash equilibria, all sharing the same total donations. The second induces a unique dominant-strategy equilibrium. Apparently, donor confusion over the Nash concept and coordination problems explain at most a small portion of the 'excessive' giving observed in those previous experiments that use an interior Nash design. Th...
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作者：Richter, WF; Wellisch, D
作者单位：Technische Universitat Dresden; Dortmund University of Technology
摘要：This paper studies the efficiency properties of allocations when firms and households are mobile and when local governments provide local public goods and local public factors. The analysis differentiates between immobile land owners and perfectly mobile workers and concludes that an efficient allocation is obtained if there is no outflow of land rents to absentee owners. If rents flow out, only local public goods are supplied in accordance with the Samuelson Rule. The provision of local publi...
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作者：Cullis, JG; Jones, PR
作者单位：University of Bath
摘要：If individuals are interested in life per se (or perceive longevity as a goal worth attaining), there is reason to doubt that Brent (Journal of Public Economics, 1991, 22, 165-171) has provided a robust solution to the valuation of life in cost-benefit analysis.
