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作者：Bellora, Cecilia; Bourgeon, Jean-Marc
作者单位：INRAE; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique
摘要：Pests create biodiversity effects that increase food production risks and decrease productivity when agricultural production is specialized. Pesticides contain these effects, but damage the environment and human health. When opening to trade, governments are tempted to restrict pesticide use because, with more food being imported, less pesticide is needed for domestic consumption. However, pesticide restrictions hinder the competitiveness of their agricultural sector on international markets. ...
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作者：Boel, Paola; Waller, Christopher J.
作者单位：Sveriges Riksbank; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis; Deakin University
摘要：We construct a monetary economy with aggregate liquidity shocks and heterogeneous idiosyncratic preference shocks. In this environment, not all agents are satiated at the zero lower bound (ZLB) even when the Friedman rule is the best interest-rate policy the central bank can implement. As a consequence, central bank stabilization policy, which takes the form of repo arrangements in response to aggregate demand shocks, temporarily relaxes the liquidity constraint of impatient agents at the ZLB....
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作者：Boone, Jan; Schottmueller, Christoph
作者单位：Tilburg University; University of Cologne
摘要：We provide a modeling framework to analyze selective contracting in the health-care sector. Two health-care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low-cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power reduces the scope for signaling, thereb...
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作者：Gorry, Aspen; Gorry, Devon; Trachter, Nicholas
作者单位：Clemson University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Richmond
摘要：Individuals experience frequent occupational switches during their lifetime, and initial worker characteristics are predictive of future patterns of occupational switching. We construct a quantitative model of occupational choices with worker learning and occupation-specific productivity shocks to match life cycle patterns of occupational transitions and quantify the value of occupational mobility and learning. For the average 18-year-old worker, the value of being able to switch occupations i...
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作者：Horan, Sean; Osborne, Martin J.; Sanver, M. Remzi
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Toronto; Universite PSL; Universite Paris-Dauphine; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：May's theorem shows that if the set of alternatives contains two members, an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule is positively responsive if and only if it is majority rule. We show that if the set of alternatives contains three or more alternatives only the rule that assigns to every problem its strict Condorcet winner satisfies the three conditions plus Nash's version of independence of irrelevant alternatives for the domain of problems that have strict Condorcet winners. We show al...
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作者：Jung, Hojin; Kosmopoulou, Georgia; Lamarche, Carlos; Sicotte, Richard
作者单位：Jeonbuk National University; University of Oklahoma System; University of Oklahoma - Norman; University of Kentucky; University of Vermont
摘要：When firms bid in procurement auctions, they take into account the likelihood of future contract renegotiations. If they anticipate that certain input quantities will change ex post, they have an incentive to strategically skew their itemized bids, thereby increasing profits for themselves and costs for the procuring agency. We develop and estimate a structural model of strategic bidding using a data set of road construction projects in Vermont. We find that bidding strategies lead to increase...
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作者：Esponda, Ignacio; Pouzo, Demian
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：We provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization. We contrast sophisticated (Nash) versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies. Retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy; instead, they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance, as determined in equilibrium. We show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective, compared to Na...
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作者：Karaivanov, Alexander; Saurina, Jesus; Townsend, Robert M.
作者单位：Simon Fraser University; Banco de Espana; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We examine the effect of financial constraints on firm investment and cash flow. We combine data from the Spanish Mercantile Registry and the Bank of Spain Credit Registry to classify firms according to whether they are family-owned, not family-owned, or belong to a family-linked network of firms and according to their number of banking relations (with none, one, or several banks). Our empirical strategy is structural, based on a dynamic model solved numerically to generate the joint distribut...
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作者：van den Berg, Gerard J.; van der Klaauw, Bas
作者单位：University of Bristol; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：To evaluate search effort monitoring of unemployed workers, it is important to take account of post-unemployment wages and job-to-job mobility. We structurally estimate a model with search channels, using a controlled trial in which monitoring is randomized. The data include registers and survey data on search behavior. We find that the opportunity to move to better-paid jobs in employment reduces the extent to which monitoring induces substitution toward formal search channels in unemployment...
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作者：Kim, Kyungmin; Kim, Sun Hyung
作者单位：University of Miami; University of Iowa
摘要：We consider a seller who has private information about the quality of her good but is uncertain about buyer arrivals. Assuming that the high-quality seller insists on a price, we show that the low-quality seller's surplus and pricing strategy crucially depend on buyers' knowledge about the demand state. If they are also uncertain about demand, then demand uncertainty increases the low-quality seller's expected payoff, and her optimal strategy is to lower the price after some time. If buyers kn...
