DO HEALTH INSURERS CONTRACT THE BEST PROVIDERS? PROVIDER NETWORKS, QUALITY, AND COSTS

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boone, Jan; Schottmueller, Christoph
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; University of Cologne
• 刊物名称: INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0020-6598
• DOI: 10.1111/iere.12383
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 1209-1247
• 关键词: managed care; insurance; COMPETITION; equilibrium; incentives; MARKETS; demand; plans

摘要

We provide a modeling framework to analyze selective contracting in the health-care sector. Two health-care providers differ in quality and costs. When buying health insurance, consumers observe neither provider quality nor costs. We derive an equilibrium where health insurers signal provider quality through their choice of provider network. Selective contracting focuses on low-cost providers. Contracting both providers signals high quality. Market power reduces the scope for signaling, thereby leading to lower quality and inefficiency.