作者：Guth, W; Huck, S; Ockenfels, P
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：In a two-level ultimatum game one player offers an amount to two other players who then, in the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game. The first offer has to be accepted by the second proposer. Only the first proposer knew the true cake size whose a priori-probabilities were commonly known. The fact that most proposers with the large cake offered two thirds of the small cake has important implications for the theory of distributive justice better informed parties ...
作者：Bernard, AB; Jones, CI
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：The empirical convergence literature envisages a world in which the presence or lack of convergence is a function of capital accumulation. This focus ignores a long tradition among economic historians and growth theorists which emphasises technology and the potential for technology transfer. We suggest here that this neglect is an important oversight: simple models which incorporate technology transfer provide a richer framework for thinking about convergence. Empirically, differences in techn...
作者：Friedman, D
摘要：Evolutionary game theory informs the design and analysis of 26 experimental sessions using normal form games with 6-24: players. The state typically converges to the subset of Nash equilibria called evolutionary equilibria, especially under conditions of mean matching and history. Mixed strategy equilibria are explained better by 'purification' strategies than by homogenous independent individual randomisation. The risk dominance criterion fares poorly in some coordination game environments. W...
