Equilibrium in evolutionary games: Some experimental results

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Friedman, D
• 刊物名称: ECONOMIC JOURNAL
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0013-0133
• DOI: 10.2307/2234928
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 1-25
• 关键词: modeling rational players; strategy nash equilibria; BEHAVIOR

摘要

Evolutionary game theory informs the design and analysis of 26 experimental sessions using normal form games with 6-24: players. The state typically converges to the subset of Nash equilibria called evolutionary equilibria, especially under conditions of mean matching and history. Mixed strategy equilibria are explained better by 'purification' strategies than by homogenous independent individual randomisation. The risk dominance criterion fares poorly in some coordination game environments. With small player populations and large gains to cooperative behaviour, some players apparently attempt to influence other players' actions, contrary to a key theoretical assumption.