Two-level ultimatum bargaining with incomplete information: An experimental study
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Guth, W; Huck, S; Ockenfels, P
署名单位：
Goethe University Frankfurt
刊物名称：
ECONOMIC JOURNAL
ISSN/ISSBN：
0013-0133
DOI：
10.2307/2235565
发表日期：
1996
页码：
593-604
关键词：
摘要：
In a two-level ultimatum game one player offers an amount to two other players who then, in the case of acceptance, divide this amount by playing an ultimatum game. The first offer has to be accepted by the second proposer. Only the first proposer knew the true cake size whose a priori-probabilities were commonly known. The fact that most proposers with the large cake offered two thirds of the small cake has important implications for the theory of distributive justice better informed parties do not question that others want a fair share and, thus, pretend fairness by 'hiding behind some small cake'.