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作者：Parkhomenko, Andrii
作者单位：University of Southern California; Kyiv School of Economics
摘要：Why are job polarization and income inequality higher in large U.S. cities? I offer a new explanation: when house prices grow faster in large cities, middle-income households increasingly cannot afford to own a house there. They move to smaller cities and the middle of the income distribution in large cities hollows out, making them more polarized and unequal. I document that (1) cities with higher price growth experienced larger polarization and increase in inequality since 1980 and (2) middl...
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作者：Che, Yeon-Koo; Zhong, Weijie
作者单位：Columbia University; Stanford University
摘要：We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an ambiguity set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies various moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. The analysis reveals general properties of the ambiguity set that justifies categorical bundling...
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作者：Corbae, Dean; Glover, Andrew
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Kansas City
摘要：We develop a framework to understand pre-employment credit screening as a signal from credit markets that alleviates adverse selection in labour markets. In our theory, people differ in both their propensity to default on debt and the profits they create for firms that employ them; in our calibrated economy, highly productive workers have a low default probability. This leads firms to create more jobs for those with good credit, which creates a poverty trap: an unemployed worker with poor cred...
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作者：Bastianello, Francesca; Fontanier, Paul
作者单位：University of Chicago; Yale University
摘要：We study mislearning from equilibrium prices, and contrast this with mislearning from exogenous fundamentals. We micro-found mislearning from prices with a psychologically founded theory of Partial Equilibrium Thinking (PET), where traders learn fundamental information from prices, but fail to realize others do so too. PET leads to over-reaction, and upward sloping demand curves, thus contributing to more inelastic markets. The degree of individual-level over-reaction and the extent of inelast...
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作者：De Nardi, Mariacristina; Pashchenko, Svetlana; Porapakkarm, Ponpoje
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; National Bureau of Economic Research; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia; National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
摘要：What generates the observed differences in economic outcomes by health? How costly it is to be unhealthy? We show that health dynamics are largely driven by ex-ante fixed heterogeneity, or health types, even when controlling for one's past health history. In fact, health types are the key driver of long spells of bad health. We incorporate these rich health dynamics in an estimated structural model and show that health types and their correlation with other fixed characteristics are important ...
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作者：Bazzi, Samuel; Hilmy, Masyhur; Marx, Benjamin
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research; University of New South Wales Sydney; Boston University
摘要：This paper explores how state and religious providers of education compete during the nation building process. Using novel administrative data, we characterize the evolution of Indonesia's Islamic education system and religious school choice after the introduction of mass public primary schooling in the 1970s. Funded through informal taxation, Islamic schools competed with the state by entering in the same markets. While primary enrollment shifted towards state schools, religious education inc...
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作者：Kawai, Kei; Nakabayashi, Jun; Ortner, Juan
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Tokyo; Kyoto University; Boston University
摘要：We study how incentive constraints can be relaxed by randomization in a repeated-game setting. Our study is motivated by the workings of a detected bidding cartel that adopted a protocol of keeping the winning bid secret from the designated losers when defection was a concern. Keeping the winning bid secret makes accurately undercutting the winning bid more difficult and makes defection less attractive as potential defectors risk not winning the auction even if they deviate. We formalize these...
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作者：Ciscato, Edoardo
作者单位：KU Leuven
摘要：Complementarities between partners' characteristics are often held responsible for the patterns of assortative mating observed in marriage markets along different dimensions, such as race and education. However, when the marriage market is segmented into racially and educationally homogeneous clusters, people naturally have more match opportunities with their likes. In this paper, we build an empirically tractable dynamic matching model with endogenous separation and remarriage. In every perio...
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作者：Caramp, Nicolas
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：What sows the seeds of financial crises, and what policies can help avoid them? I model the interaction between the ex-ante production of assets and ex-post adverse selection in financial markets. Positive shocks that increase market prices exacerbate the production of low-quality assets and can increase the likelihood of a financial market collapse. The interest rate and the liquidity premium are endogenous and depend on the functioning of financial markets as well as the total supply of asse...
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作者：Blattman, Christopher; Duncan, Gustavo; Lessing, Benjamin; Tobon, Santiago
作者单位：University of Chicago; Universidad EAFIT
摘要：Criminal groups govern millions worldwide. Even in strong states, gangs resolve disputes and provide security. Why do these duopolies of coercion emerge? Often, gangs fill vacuums of official power, suggesting that increasing state presence should crowd out criminal governance. We show, however, that state and gang rule can be strategic complements. In particular, gangs could minimize seizures and arrests by keeping neighbourhoods orderly and loyal. If true, increasing state presence could inc...
