Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Che, Yeon-Koo; Zhong, Weijie
• 署名单位: Columbia University; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0034-6527
• DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae107
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 2923-2951
• 关键词: Revenue maximization; DESIGN

摘要

We study robustly optimal mechanisms for selling multiple items. The seller maximizes revenue against a worst-case distribution of a buyer's valuations within a set of distributions, called an ambiguity set. We identify the exact forms of robustly optimal selling mechanisms and the worst-case distributions when the ambiguity set satisfies various moment conditions on the values of subsets of goods. The analysis reveals general properties of the ambiguity set that justifies categorical bundling, which includes separate sales and pure bundling as special cases.