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作者：Hintermann, Beat; Schoeman, Beaumont; Molloy, Joseph; Gotschi, Thomas; Castro, Alberto; Tchervenkov, Christopher; Tomic, Uros; Axhausen, Kay W.
作者单位：University of Basel; University of Hamburg; University of Oregon; University of Basel; Swiss Tropical & Public Health Institute; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We implement Pigovian transport pricing in a field experiment in urban agglomerations of Switzerland over the course of 8 weeks. Our pricing considers the external costs from climate damages, health outcomes from pollution, accidents and physical activity, and congestion. It varies across time, space, and mode of transport and is deducted from a budget provided to GPS-tracked participants. The treatment significantly reduces the external costs of transport during the course of the experiment. ...
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作者：Leung, Michael P.; Moon, Hyungsik Roger
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz; University of Southern California; Yonsei University
摘要：We prove a central limit theorem for network formation models with strategic interactions and homophilous agents. Since data often consists of observations on a single large network, we consider an asymptotic framework in which the network size diverges. We argue that a modification of stabilization conditions from the literature on geometric graphs provides a useful high-level formulation of weak dependence which we utilize to establish an abstract central limit theorem. Using results in bran...
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作者：House, Christopher L.; Proebsting, Christian; Tesar, Linda L.
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; KU Leuven
摘要：Unemployment differentials are greater between countries in the euro area than between U.S. states. In both regions, net migration responds to unemployment differentials, though the response is smaller in the euro area compared to the U.S. We use a multi-country DSGE model with cross-border migration to quantify Mundell's hypothesis that labour mobility could substitute for independent monetary policy in a currency union. While not as effective as independent monetary policy, increased labour ...
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作者：Jehiel, Philippe; Weber, Giacomo
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Bologna
摘要：Normal-form two-player games are categorized by players into K analogy classes so as to minimize the prediction error about the behaviour of the opponent. This results in Clustered Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibria in which strategies are analogy-based expectation equilibria given the analogy partitions and analogy partitions minimize the prediction errors given the strategies. We distinguish between environments with self-repelling analogy partitions in which some mixing over partitions is...
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作者：Pei, Harry
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study repeated games with anonymous random matching where players can add or remove signals from their records. The ability to manipulate records introduces monotonicity constraints on players' continuation values, under which sufficiently long-lived players will almost never cooperate. When players' expected lifespans are intermediate, their ability to sustain cooperation depends on (i) whether their actions are complements or substitutes and (ii) whether manipulation takes the form of addi...
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作者：Qian, Nancy; Tabellini, Marco
作者单位：National Bureau of Economic Research; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Harvard University
摘要：This paper documents that the Pearl Harbor attack triggered a sharp increase in volunteer enlistment rates of American men, the magnitude of the increase was smaller for Black men than for White men and the Black-White gap was larger in counties with higher levels of racial discrimination. The results suggest that political exclusion and discrimination can undermine support for the government during critical times such as war.
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作者：Araujo, Rafael; Costa, Francisco; Sant'Anna, Marcelo
作者单位：Getulio Vargas Foundation; Getulio Vargas Foundation
摘要：This paper estimates the Brazilian Amazon's carbon-efficient forest cover-i.e. when farmers internalize the social cost of carbon. We propose a dynamic discrete choice land-use model and estimate it using a panel of land use and carbon stock of 5.7 billion pixels between 2008 and 2017. The business-as-usual scenario implies an inefficient release of 42 billion tons of CO2 in the long run, resulting from the deforestation of an area twice the size of France. A carbon tax that makes farmers inte...
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作者：Ale-Chilet, Jorge; Chen, Cuicui; Li, Jing; Reynaert, Mathias
作者单位：Universidad de los Andes - Chile; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Albany, SUNY; Tufts University; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We study collusion among firms against imperfectly monitored environmental regulation. Firms increase variable profits by violating regulation and reduce expected noncompliance penalties by violating jointly. We consider a case of three German automakers colluding to reduce the effectiveness of emissions control technology. By estimating a structural model of the European automobile industry from 2007 to 2018, we find that collusion lowers expected noncompliance penalties substantially and inc...
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作者：Ottonello, Pablo
作者单位：Brown University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper studies the unemployment of physical capital-defined as idle units searching to be traded-and its macroeconomic implications. I provide evidence documenting that capital unemployment is large, volatile, and increases during economic downturns. I construct a capital-accumulation model that explains these patterns, with trading frictions in capital markets, which give rise to equilibrium capital unemployment, and financial shocks, which lead to large fluctuations in trading probabilit...
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作者：Britz, Volker; Gersbach, Hans
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：The seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989, Bargaining in Legislatures, American Political Science Review, 83, 1181-1206) leaves significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. We aim to fill these gaps by providing a fresh analysis of open rule bargaining. Our approach relies on an appealing class of stationary equilibria. In this class, we show that delays tend to be longer and allocations tend to be less egalitarian than originally predicted by Baron and Ferejohn. Our resu...
